Showing posts with label Slavery. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Slavery. Show all posts

Wednesday, February 15, 2012

Lecture Five: Degeneracy, Culture, and Critique - Part I: Science, Reason, and Knowledge I


Lecture Five:
Degeneracy, Culture,
and Critique
-
Part I:
Science, Reason,
and Knowledge I [DRAFT]
_________________________________
 
We have already staked out a wide domain for the emergence of Cultural Studies even at this relatively early point in this series of lectures. We have also, or at least I hope we have also called into question not a few things that might have been taken for granted or seemed “just the way the world is.”

The purpose of our introduction is not to denounce or disavow the objects of our critique – though in other contexts it might be appropriate to do both – nor is it to give a special authority to Cultural Studies over other approaches and formal disciplines. I hope that in the course of these lectures, you will recognize that Cultural Studies is as much a cultural artifact as are the objects of its analysis. It might appear that academics such as myself are above the reach of the everyday, but a quick reminder of Kant’s recognition of the Emperor’s power should persuade you otherwise.

Understanding this point is in itself a very good reason for asking you to view the two documentaries before us, Michael Wood’s Hitler’s Search for the Holy Grail and the PBS-style Degenerate Art. Both of them illustrate the need to critique knowledge as well as artistic production. They also set the stage for the first tendency in Cultural Studies, the critical theory of the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research [the “Frankfurt School”].

and holy and wonderful being; but we must also inform him that in our State such as he are not permitted to exist; the law will not allow them. And so when we have anointed him with myrrh and set a garland od wool on his head [‘tarred and feathered”], we shall send him away to another city. For we mean to employ for our souls’ health the rougher and severer poet or storyteller who will imitate the style of the virtuous only, and will follow those models which we prescribe at first when we began the education of our soldiers.” Plato, Republic, Book III, 398.

And Socrates’ other student, Xenophon, tells us that indeed one of the charges against Socrates was that he had misused the poets to undermine the State: “...his accuser alleged that he selected the most immoral passages, and used them as evidence in teaching his companions to be tyrants and malefactors....” Xenophon, Memorabilia, I. II., 53-57; pp. 39. Of course, as students of Socrates, each in their own way defended him against the charges. Art effects the soul, whose care has consequences for the State and was one of Plato’s chief concerns in his Republic. Sorrowful or relaxing music as well as flutes excepts those used by shepherds far from the city walls would be banned in the Republic. Stringed instruments except for the harp and the lyre would also be prohibited because “our principle is that rhythm and harmony are regulated by the words, and not the words by them.” Plato, Republic, Book III, 400.

“But shall not our superintendence go no further, and are the poets only to be required by us to express the image of the good in their works, on pain, if they do anything else, of expulsion from our State? Or is the same control to be extended to other artists, and are they also to be prohibited from exhibiting the opposite forms of vice and intemperance and meanness and indecency in sculpture and building and other creative arts; and is he who can not conform to this rule of ours to be prevented from practicing his art in our state, lest the taste of our citizens be corrupted by him? We would not have our guardians grow up amid images of moral deformity, as in some noxious pasture, and here browse and feed upon many a baneful herb and flower day by day, little by little, until they silently gather a festering mass of corruption in their own soul. Let our artists rather be those who are gifted to discern the true nature of the beautiful and graceful; then will our youth dwell in a land of health, amid fair sights and sounds,and receive the good in everything; and beauty, the effluence of fair works, shall flow into the eye and ear, like a health-giving breeze from a purer region, and insensibly draw the soul from earliest years into likeness and sympathy with the beauty of reason.
There can be no nobler training than that, he replied.  Plato, Republic, Book III, 401.

Certainly you find this idea of committed art in, for example, Thucydides’ “Funeral Oration of Pericles”

“When we do kindness to others, we do not do them out of any calculations of profit or loss: we do them without afterthought, relying on our free liberality. Taking everything together, I declare our city is an education to Greece.... Mighty indeed are the marks and monuments which we have left. Future ages will wonder at us, as the present age wonders at us now. We do not need the praises of a Homer, or of anyone else whose words may delight us for the moment, but whose estimation of facts will fall short of what is really there. For our adventurous spirit has forced an entry into every sea and into every land; and everywhere we have left behind us everlasting monuments of good done to our friends or suffering inflicted on our enemies.” (Thucydides, Peloponesian War, pp.119-120)

Pericles goes on to at the end implore the wives and mothers of the dead to have and care for more children so that they might replenish the ranks defending Athens. Where there is a matter of the government of territory and population Art with a capital A is never far behind. Who else designed and made all those different kinds of uniforms, after all, so that soldiers might recognize which territory and population that they each fought for.

And of course, the Greeks were not alone in leaving their marks and monuments upon the landscape:

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/f/f1/Behistun_inscription_reliefs.jpg/1280px-Behistun_inscription_reliefs.jpg


https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/12/RomeConstantine%27sArch03.jpg

At least Pericles admits that the Athenian monuments serve an ideological purpose; they are “an education to Greece.”

Be that as it may for the Classical era – and we should always be careful not to read the present back onto the past just to suit us – for the purposes of understanding our era, we have to begin with the premise that education, ideology, and knowledge are ineluctably linked to each other and each is as well an aspect of Reason, the State, and the social relations of Capital. What we call science, and what we say it establishes as true [or rather knowledge] changes over time. Science is the human pursuit of knowledge of the material world, and it changes as we change the material world and are changed by it. There are, of course, many who would take exception to this provisional definition, and you should take their objections seriously. No one has all of the answers, including myself. Socrates gave us that bit of wisdom, too.

The distinction is often made between science and scientists, that error and bias reside with the scientists, while science corrects such errors. It might even seem as though if only we could have better people then we would presumably have better science as the foibles and limitations of humans would no longer stand in the way of scientific knowledge. It is ironic that rather than separating science from scientists, those who sympathize with such a view are readily admitting that science is not separate from social relations, it is just that those scientists and naturalists of the past are often seen as having been more gullible, more prone to error and more likely to be susceptible to the scientific ideologies of their day then we are in ours. This is a version of saying that we are smarter now than they were then. A little idea of progress is always sure to message the egos of any contemporary, no matter the era in which they thrived.

Well, one thing we can say is that those lesser beings of our past were quite often perfectly secure in their knowledge that they were superior to their predecessors, too. Cultural Studies should lead us to learn humility as we, like the Angel Novus, are thrown forward rather than the hubris that comes with an ideology of intellectual progress.
One could argue that science is a form of rationalist and skeptical materialism and as such has a long history. However, the institution of the laboratory and the figure of the scientist are of relative recent invention.

Look at these two charts from Google, which show the references in English to Scientist, scientist, Laboratory, laboratory, Science, and science – it is unfortunately case sensitive – from 1800 to 2008. Notice that the term scientist appears rather late, as it is coined by William Whewell [ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_Whewell ] in 1833 (he also gets credit for the term “physicist,” too)








The distinction between scientists and science also has the ultimate result of making science into something metaphysical – another ironic aspect of the distinction – i. e., beyond the physical world. Making science into a metaphysical entity (“a mysterious hieroglyphic” – to use Marx’s phrase) results most importantly for our understanding of science, into the removing of history and social relations. I suppose that is the point, since the idea is to make science into something that is not effected by the social or even, to a large degree, by its own history.

Remove science from the material of society and history and you are left with a jaundiced science, but also a science that might be adapted or adapt itself to any set of historical social relations or reconciled with any history written for the dominate ideology. Indeed, many of the errors of scientific ideology that we would like to forget, such as the science of Eugenics, were directed towards the government or populations and territories.

To avoid this, one should try to see science as having a history and this history is predominately a history of errors, as George Canguilhem (Ideology and Rationality in the History of the life Sciences) has noted and W. P. D. Wightman (Growth of Scientific Ideas,1951) affirmed: science is “set in the context of the history of language & human institutions of every kind.” After all, if science is a self-correcting process, then even leaving aside the question of social embeddedness for a moment, what is it correcting if not error and what are today’s errors but yesterday’s truths? This is what is really means to say that “science is a process.” Even the term scientist did not exist until 1833. Was there “science’ before there were ‘scientists”? If not then science is a relatively new invention for understanding the world and thus hardly a candidate for being an eternal human pursuit. If the answer is yes, then the history of science demonstrates that scientific knowledge is conditioned by the contemporary structure of social relations. Both views, however, leave open the possibility that science as we know it is a product of the social transformations of industrial society and the accompanying division of labor. Certainly Whewell was thinking of the scientists as the embodiment of a new rationalism.

But lets be clear that in critiquing the authority of science we are not advocating irrationalism. Far from it. The great materialist philosopher Epicurus responded to the charge that he disavowed the gods by stating that it was not he who insulted the gods, but those who affirmed the commonplace views of the gods who truly insulted them. It is much the same with us. We are taking science seriously, rather than degrading it by elevating it to a metaphysical realm.

To emphasize the relation between education, science, and ideology, I want to turn your attention to a somewhat neglected series of events in the history of science that Michael Wood introduces. Despite its unfortunate title, Wood shows us how science and ideology can be linked and made to enhance the authority of one enhances the authority of both. The documented events are the context from which the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory arose. It was in the midst of these and the events to be described next week that Critical attention began to be given to the artifacts of popular culture and everyday life.

Every successful revolution has promoted some form of mass literacy, some grand reform of the educational system. No matter whether the revolution was from the left or the right. The Americans, the Soviets, the Cubans, the Sandinistas, etc. all embarked on some form of literacy campaign. After all, you need to be able to read the Constitution, Wall Street Journal, Daily Worker, or whatever, for yourself. So we should not be surprised when we take note of how central education/knowledge was to the long-term goals of the Third Reich. The emphasis on the purity and development of youthful bodies was not at all discontinuous from this emphasis on knowledge. In fact, the raising of youth for the new Reich demanded the strict regulation of all aspects of education and knowledge, including science. What the young German had to learn to become a National Socialist was all important.

“For education in the Third Reich, as Hitler envisaged it, was not to be confined to stuffy classrooms but to be furthered by a Spartan, political and martial training in the successive youth groups and to reach its climax not so much in the universities and engineering colleges, which absorbed but a small minority, but first, at the age of eighteen, in compulsory labor service and then in service, as conscripts, in the armed forces.... ‘The whole education by a national state,’ he had written, ‘must aim primarily not at the stuffing with mere knowledge but a building bodies which are physically healthy to the core.’ But even more important, he had stressed in his book the importance of winning over and then training the youth in the service of ‘a new national state’ – a subject he returned to often after he became German dictator. ‘When an opponent declares, “I will not come over to your side,”’ he said in a speech on November 6, 1933, ‘I will calmly say, “Your child belongs to us already... What are you? You will pass on. Your descendents, however, now stand in the new camp. In a short time they will know nothing else but this new community.’” (Shirer. [1950] 1960. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. p.343.)

Education was organized through the reduction of the social status of teachers and professors except for those who had already dedicated their careers to the study of Race Science (Rassenkunde) or those who now embraced the view that ‘science, like every other human product, is racial and conditioned by blood” (Shirer, p.345.)

“Every person in the teaching professions, from kindergarten through the universities, was compelled to join the National Socialist Teachers’ League which, by law, was held ‘responsible for the execution of the ideological and political coordination of all teachers in accordance with National Socialist doctrine.’ The Civil Service Act of 1937 required teachers to be ‘the executors of the will of the party-supported State’ and to be ready ‘at any time to defend without reservation the National Socialist State.’ An earlier decree has classified them as civil servants and thus subject to the racial laws. Jews, of course, were forbidden to teach. All teachers took an oath to ‘be loyal and obedient to Adolf Hitler.’ Later, no one could teach who had not first served in the S. A., the Labor Service, or the Hitler Youth. Candidates for instructorships in the universities had to attend for six weeks an observation camp where their views and character were studied by Nazi experts and reported to the Ministry of Education, which issued licenses to teach based on the candidates political ‘reliability.’” (Shirer. [1950] 1960. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich. p.344)

See also:
 [Karl] Barth is Suspended
Professor Refuses to Take Fealty Oath to Hitler



Heidegger, in his capacity as Rektor of the University of Freiburg, sits fourth from the right at a public demonstration of support for Nazism by German professors on 11 November 1933 in Leipzig.  http://www.think-israel.org/jan12pix/nazi.heidegger.jpg
 Heidegger is in the middle of the photo as he was on his way to give his first address as Rector of the university in 1933.  https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhj6nJIOarKxTs8bN391VpVo8beJzboJugdNoP4NRk3MwiUhN8SN_WEkNKD_3aq8TX55fi2qtiGRgLiLaJ2eNU2qBK7npUaLPoEFKwCIfk6Hy_Ezx9KAFlWoTQSCVjTbW_J_RW5YC-V/s1600/Rektor.jpg


We might assume that universities were centers of liberalism. Certainly the common view of modern American academia is of a bastion of liberalism or even radicalism. In neither case is this commonplace view correct. In reality, it depends on the specific field and department. Yes it is more likely that a sociology professor will be a liberal than a professor of business administration, but there are far more professors of business or engineering than there are professors of sociology. Then, of course, there are those professors that imagine themselves to be liberal or radical when they actually espouse conservative positions. (For example, one commonly hears from a vocal few that “I am a Marxist (or radical, or anarchist or committed to one or another identity-based ‘new politics’)” and that is used to justify an opposition to being unionized. In the old days one would hear the call for Black separatism, which would have in fact only served to reinforce the system of segregation that gripped America. The examples are many. So to see the university or academics as liberal or radical is to simply and conveniently ignore the obvious. Universities are inherently conservative institutions where the vast majority of students and faculty are to be found in so-called apolitical or technical fields (e.g., engineering, medical, computer science, forensics, etc.) or in fields that tend to affirm the current status quo of social relations (law, business, sports, architecture, etc.). The Frankfurt School itself owed its existence to a wealthy philanthropist who funded it because there was no space for them in the conventional university. It was affiliated with the university, but was largely separate. The only other similar institution would have been the Bauhaus, and in fact they were created within a couple of years of each other and there was a good deal of personal and intellectual exchange between them.
Ludwig Mies van der Rohe designed the monument to Rosa Luxemburg and Gropius was close to Alban Berg, Adorno’s friend and teacher. Berg’s Violin Concerto (To the Memory of an Angel) was composed as a memorial to Gropius’ and Alma Mahler’s recently deceased 18 year-old daughter, Manon. Anton Webern perhaps because he was too upset by Berg’s own death in December 1935 to conduct the premiere in April 1936, but conducted the U. K. premiere of the work only a couple of months later.

Leonid Kogan plays Alban Berg's violin concerto.


There are many other connections, and these connections were as much due to the fact that both institutions were quite marginal during their day and became more so as the authoritarian movement grew until those that could fled the continent.

“The Wiemar Republic had insisted on academic freedom, and one result had been that the vast majority of university teachers, anti-liberal, undemocratic, anti-Semitic as they were, had helped to undermine the democratic regime. Most professors were fanatical nationalists who wished the return of a conservative, monarchical Germany.... By 1932 the majority of students appeared to be enthusiastic for Hitler.
It was surprising to some how many members of the university faculties knuckled under to the Nazification of higher learning after 1933. Though official figures put the number of professors and instructors dismissed during the first five years of the regime at 2,800 – about one fourth of the total number – the proportion of those who lost their posts through defying National Socialism was, as Professor Wilhem Roepke, himself dismissed from the university of Marburg in 1933, said, ‘exceedingly small.’ Though small, there were names famous in the German academic world: Karl Jaspers, E.I. Gumbel, Theordor Litt, Karl Barth, Julius Ebbinghaus and dozens of others. Most of them emigrated, first to Switzerland, Holland, and England and eventually to America.... A large majority of professors, however, remained at their posts, and as early as the autumn of 1933 some 960 of them, led by such luminaries as Professors Sauerbach, the surgeon, Heidegger, the existentialist philosopher, and Pinder, the art historian, took a public vow to support Hitler and the National Socialist regime.
‘It was a scene of prostitution,’ Professor Roepke later wrote, ‘that has stained the honorable history of German learning.’” (William Shirer. [1950] 1960. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, p.347)

“The new Nazi era of German culture was illuminated not only by the bonfires of books and the more effective, if less symbolic, measures of proscribing the sale or library circulation of hundreds of volumes and the publishing of many new ones, but by the regimentation of culture on a scale which no modern Western nation had ever experienced. As early as September 22, 1933, the Reich Chamber of Culture had been set up by law under the direction of Dr. Goebbels. Its purpose was defined, in the words of the law, as follows: ‘In order to pursue a policy of German culture, it is necessary to gather together the creative artists in all spheres into a unified organization under the leadership of the Reich. The Reich must not only determine the lines of progress, mental, and spiritual, but also lead and organize the professions.’”
“Seven subchambers were established to guide and control every sphere of cultural life: The Reich chambers of fine arts, music, the theater, literature, the press, radio and the films. All persons engaged in these fields were obligated to join their respective chambers, whose decisions and directives had the validity of law. Among other powers, the chambers could expel – or refuse to accept – members for ‘political unreliability,’ which meant that those who were lukewarm about National Socialism could be, and usually were, excluded from practicing their profession or art and thus deprived of a livelihood.... Every manuscript of a book or a play had to be submitted to the Propaganda Ministry before it could be approved for publication or production. (William Shirer. [1950] 1960. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, pp. 333-334.)

“After six years of Nazification the number of university students dropped more than one half – from 127,920 to 58,325. The decline in enrollment at the institutes of technology, from which Germany got its scientists and engineers, was even greater – from 20,474 to 9,554.” (William Schirer. [1950] 1960. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, pp.347-348)

But those who espoused the creation of a German science were the extreme; less obvious still are those that simply went along so as to either further their own careers or their scientific fields (which no doubt in the long run would also be personally beneficial). Some of these were swept up in the social movements of the time, while others went about work which tellingly could fit within the structures of either the Wiemar Republic or the Third Reich.

Shirer may be forgiven for his denunciation of the professors. He had witnessed the rise of National Socialism as a reporter in Berlin and other European capitals; interviewed most of the major and minor figures in the years before the declaration of war between the United States and Germany, covered the war as a combat reporter, and continued his work during the post-war period. He was the first reporter picked by the legendary Edward R. Murrow to work for CBS News. His radio reports are just as notable as his later work with Edward R. Morrow ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_L._Shirer )

A documentary of the book was made (something that would not happen today!) and you can view it here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sfjm9Ic-Ric

As a witness to the book burnings of May 1933, Shirer reminds us that the bonfires took place not in some Nazi cellar or stadium rally, but “opposite the University of Berlin” after “a torchlight parade of thousands of students.” (Shirer, p.333) you’ve seen clips of that night and you see glimpses of them in both documentaries. Shirer relates that some twenty thousand books were burned that night in Berlin and at rallies in several other cities. He gives a partial list of the authors whose works were put to the torch:

“Thomas Mann, Heinrich Mann, Lion Feuchtwanger, Jakob Wassermann, Arnold and Stefan Zweig, Erich Maria Remarque, Walther Rathenau, Albert Einstein, Alfred Kerr, and Hugo Preuss, the last named being the scholar who had drafted the Weimar Constitution....Jack London, Upton Sinclair, Helen Keller, Margaret Sanger, H. G. Wells, Havelock Ellis, Arthur Schnitzler, [Sigmund] Freud, [Andre] Gide, [Emile] Zola, [ ] Proust. In the words of a student proclamation, any book was condemned to the flames ‘which acts subversively on our future or strikes at the root of German thought, the German home, and the driving forces of our people.’” (William Schirer. [1950] 1960. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, p.333.)

If we had time we would look at the chapter “The Misunderstood Poet” from Brent Engelmann’s Everyday Life in Nazi Germany to get even more of an understanding of how the burnings were no mere propaganda/media events, but indicative of the changes in everyday life that many – if they were not of a suspect class or degenerate stock – were rapidly adjusting themselves to accommodate. Christopher Isherwood was in Berlin during the same period as Shirer and so they give us two nicely parallel artifacts of the era. Isherwood writes in his Berlin Stories how much had changed during the years he taught English in Berlin. Thugs from the SA, the forerunner of the SS, now stood about accosting passersby and acting as moral police. One of Isherwood’s students who had been a police chief under the Wiemar regime took his lessons in the semi-secrecy in his car as his driver toured them about or as they walked in a park or countryside. Isherwood recorded various encounters and like all urban dwellers, snatches of everyday life as he strolled the streets:

“Overheard in a cafe: a young Nazi is sitting with his girl; they are discussing the future of the Party. The Nazi is drunk.
‘Oh, I know we shall win, all right,” he exclaims impatiently, ‘but first blood must flow!’
The girl strokes his arm reassuringly. She is trying to get him to come home. ‘But, of course, it’s going to flow, darling,’ she coos soothingly, ‘the Leader’s promised that in our Programme.’” (Isherwood, The Berlin Stories, p.199)

In the chapter “Winter 1932-33”

“This morning as I was walking down the Bulowstrasse, the Nazis were raiding the house of a small liberal pacifist publisher. They had brought a lorry and were piling it up with the publisher’s books. The driver of the lorry mockingly read out the titles of the books to the crowd: ‘Nie Wieder Krieg!’ he shouted, holding up one of them by the corner of the cover, disgustedly, as though it were a nasty kind of reptile. Everyone roared with laughter.
‘No More War!’ echoed a fat, well-dressed woman, with a scornful, savage laugh. ‘What an idea!’” (Isherwood, The Berlin Stories, p.205.)


Nie Wieder Krieg / Never Again War, 1924 ~ Käthe Kollwitz.


[This incident may be related to the closing and sacking of the Anti-War Museum in Berlin, which occurred in March of 1933 and the work by Ernst Friedrich, who founded the museum, War Against War. It is one of the most noted works in the pacifist/anarchist tradition. Be forewarned that the images in War against War are very disturbing. Friedrich wanted to convey the horror of war, much like Otto Dix, but with photographs of disfigured and crippled soldiers, military executions, and the aftermath of battle.  ‘Nie Wieder Krieg! was the slogan of the pacifist movement in the interwar period. see http://www.anti-kriegs-museum.de/english/history.html]


Shortly after witnessing the sacking of the office, Isherwood decided to leave Berlin for good. He relates that when he informed Frl. Schroeder, who boarded him,

“She is inconsolable: ‘I shall never find another gentleman like you, Herr Issyvoo – always so punctual with the rent . . . . I’m sure I don’t know what makes you want to leave Berlin, all of a sudden, like this. . . .’
It’s no use trying to explain to her, or talking politics. Already she is adapting herself, as she will adapt herself to every new regime. This morning I even heard her talking reverently about ‘Der Fuhrer’ to the porter’s wife. If anybody were to remind her that, at the elections last November, she voted communist, she would probably deny it hotly, and in perfect good faith. She is merely acclimating herself, in accordance with a natural law, like an animal which changes its coat for the winter. Thousands of people like Frl. Schroeder are acclimating themselves. After all, whatever government is in power, they are doomed to live in this town.”
(Isherwood, The Berlin Stories, pp.206-207.)

Isherwood would later become a member of the circle of Americans and European exiles in Los Angeles that included Mann, Schoenberg, Adorno, Brecht, Weill, Eisler, etc. The Berlin Stories, really two novelistic memoirs, were published in 1935 and 1939. You know some of it in a more popular form as the basis for the musical Cabaret.

Shirer and Isherwood witnessed the consolidation of the authority of the new regime. What struck both of them was the degree to which the residents of Berlin quickly acclimated themselves to the new regime. Shirer noted the effects on himself of the relentless repetition of the ideology across the realms of education, entertainment, culture, and knowledge. Indeed, the Authoritarian impulse to merge all of these under the rubric of the State was satisfied for a time.

“I myself was to experience how easily one is taken in by a lying and censored press and radio in a totalitarian state. Though unlike most Germans I had daily access to foreign newspapers, especially those of London, Paris and Zurich, which arrived the day after publication, and though I listened regularly to the BBC and other foreign broadcasts, my job necessitated the spending of many hours a day in combing the German press, checking the German radio, conferring with Nazi officials and going to party meetings. It was surprising and sometimes consternating to find that notwithstanding the opportunities I had to learn the facts and despite one’s inherent distrust of what one learned from Nazi sources, a steady diet over the years of falsifications and distortions made a certain impression on one’s mind and often misled it. No one who has not lived for years in a totalitarian land can possibly conceive how difficult it is to escape the dread consequences of a regime’s calculated and incessant propaganda. Often in a German home or office or sometimes in a casual conversation with a stranger in a restaurant, a beer hall, a cafe, I would meet with the most outlandish assertions from seemingly educated and intelligent persons. It was obvious that they were parroting some piece of nonsense they had heard on the radio or read in the newspapers. Sometimes one was tempted to say as much, but on such occasions one was met with such a stare of incredulity, such a shock of silence, as if one had blasphemed the Almighty, that one realized how useless it was even to try to make contact with a mind which had become warped and for whom the facts of life had become what Hitler and Geobbels, with their cynical disregard for truth, said they were.” (William Shirer. [1950] 1960. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, p.342.)

Into and from this mix come the human-all-too-human academics, scientists, and naturalists of the Ahnenerbe to affirm the ideology of the regime and the scientific ideologies of race and culture, to locate the origins and true nature of the Indo-European/Germanic volk and thus affirm their destiny as well.

This is a good place to break before we go on. An appropriate piece of music to hear before the second part is this, Oliver Messiaen’s Quartet for the End of Time (1941)

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UeSVu1zbF94

A work for clarinet, violin, cello and piano by Olivier Messiaen (1908-1992), who composed the piece while being held prisoner by the Germans during the Second World War. The quartet was premiered by clarinetist Henri Akoka, violinist Jean le Boulaire, cellist Étienne Pasquier and Messiaen on the piano in Stalag VIII-A in Görlitz, Germany (now Zgorzelec, Poland) on Jan. 15, 1941, before an audience of about 400 prisoners and guards.

Käthe Kollwitz, Lithograph, Gefangene, Musik Horend 
(Prisoners Listening to Music), 1925.


Canguilhem, Georges.  1988 [1977].  Ideology and Rationality inthe History of the Life Sciences.  Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Engelmann, Bernt. 1986. In Hitler’s Germany: Everyday Life in the Third Reich. New York: Pantheon Books.

Gueriin, Daniel. 1973 [1965] Fascism and Big Business. New York: pathfinder Books.
Isherwood, Christopher. 1935-1939. The Berlin Stories. New York: New Directions.

Isherwood, Christopher.  1938.  The Berlin Stories (The Last of Mr. Norris and Goodbye to Berlin.  New York: New Directions. 

Plato.  1892.  The Dialogues of Plato translated into English with Analyses and Introductions by B. Jowett.  Humphrey Milford: Oxford University Press.

Poulantzas, Nicos. 1974 [1970]. Fascism and Dictatorship: The Third International and the Problem of Fascism. New York: Verso Books.

Shirer, William. 1960 [1950]. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany. New York: Fawcett Crest. 

Thucydides.  1954.  The Peloponnesian War.  New York: Penguin Classics. 

Toland, John. 1976. Adolf Hitler. New York: Ballantine Books.

Wightman, William P. D.  1951.  The Growth of Scientific Ideas.  New Haven: Yale University Press.
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Next: Degeneracy, Culture, and Critique - Part I: Science, Reason, and Knowledge II 

Friday, January 27, 2012

Lecture Two: The Dialectic of Enlightenment I – Bach, Kant, Theresiana, Frederick, Sade, Horkheimer/Adorno


Lecture Two

The Dialectic of Enlightenment I – Bach, Kant, Theresiana, Frederick, Sade, Horkheimer/Adorno  [DRAFT]



_____________________
Reading:
Immanuel Kant. “What is Enlightenment?” http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/kant-whatis.html

Peruse:
Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, “Juliette or Enlightenment and Morality,” pgs.81-119.



Last time we looked a bit at the some misconceptions about Cultural Studies and also mentioned the origins of Cultural Studies. Today we will begin to examine some of the tendencies that came together as Cultural Studies. This means that we must first examine the ideology of enlightenment.

Now we can turn first to the idea of Enlightenment and the era of Enlightenment because it is really the foundation of our time as well as the ideology that is often critiqued in Cultural Studies. It is important to understand that critique does not mean here what it means in the studio. Broadly speaking, the idea of critique is not about simply passing judgment. It is not about good or bad, it is about understanding how ideas and things work, the social determinations of interpretation and following through the implications of their social function, i.e., working out their internal Rationality to its logical conclusions. Don’t misunderstand, it is impossible to be detached and non-judgmental, i. e., objective, and thus by critique we mean deferring judgment rather than immediately passing judgment. On another level, critique demands a self-referential act, and it demands that we must ruthlessly critique our own assumptions as we critique the ideologies and technologies of our social relations. There are real differences between critique and criticism. Too often the two become confused or are taken to mean the same thing, but critique as we mean it has much more in common with Max Weber’s concept of understanding in sociology than it does the work of the critic, or the writer of “consumer and entertainment guides,” or of an advocate for a politics who never questions their own politics. It is about, as Karl Marx said, the ruthless critique of all existing things, the taking apart of the apparatus of everyday life to understand how it is that we come to constantly reproduce that apparatus of life.

Let’s begin approaching Enlightenment by remembering that it has to common meanings: first refers to the ‘era of Enlightenment” and 2] the process of social and individual enlightenment. And remembering this, let’s begin with a bit of music, Bach’s Musical Offering from 1748.

Bach, and his manuscript for the 6 Voice Fugue http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/25/Kdf2.jpg

Here is Das Musikalische Opfer BWV 1079 (The Musical Offering) performed by Le Concert des Nations conducted by Jordi Savall.



While it is a famous piece and you have no doubt heard it before even if you did not realize what you were hearing; it is also very much the music of the Enlightenment. I say this even though Bach is already being shoved to the side by more secular and entertaining popular and court music (e.g., Bach’s own son, C. P. E. Bach, Mozart, Beethoven, and a lot of others in between).

C. P. E. Bach was a court composer for Frederick II (“the Great”) of Prussia (C.P.E. Bach: Concerto pour cello en la majeur, Ensemble Baroque de Limoges Christophe Coin, direction et Cello solo http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WnVwrArUjYM] In 1747, the elderly church musician visited his son at the Potsdam palace. Frederick, a musician, friend of Voltaire, and social reformer in the Enlightenment mode, had just acquired a new instrument, a pianoforte, the forerunner of the modern piano. Showing Bach the new instrument, and knowing of Bach’s reputation for improvisation, Frederick played a theme and “asked” Bach to improvise a fugue on it. Bach did but when told to improvise a 6 voice fugue, he politely asked to be able to write it down. He did and along with other canons and fugues it is what we know as the Musical Offering. It is an offering to the Emperor and the 6 voice fugue (“ricercar” an early term for fugue and one still used in Bach’s day) was referred to by Bach as the “Prussian Fugue.”




Bach meets Frederick the Great

Much like several of his other compositions, such as the Art of the Fugue, Bach does not specify what instrument is to be used the performance, and so we have a good number of versions of the Musical Offering such as this one orchestrated by Anton Webern and scored for small orchestra by Anton Webern, the 20th Century composer whose work --- along with that of Alban Berg and Arnold Schoenberg --- will constitute “Modern”music and become important for understanding the perspective of the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School on popular culture and ideology.


J.S. Bach: Musical Offering, BWV 1079 (Orch. Anton Webern) - 
Fuga (Ricercata) a 6 voci · Berliner Philharmoniker · Pierre Boulez.

Adorno noted that Bach deliberately failed to suggest instrumentation for many of his most important and later works so as to not limit them by the musical technology of his day and also to leave them open to future interpretation -- and the makes perfect sense for such a master of improvisation. But we will touch on these things at a later time. For now, listen to Webern’s transcription. Notice how the theme is handed between the different instruments. Listening to this, we have the music of Enlightenment at the moment when Enlightenment was already approaching its limit. The complex interaction of the musicians and the theme is not unlike the complexity that we face when trying to lay out a genealogy for Cultural Studies. When we look closely at, say the shift to the study of popular culture, it will appear as a seemingly natural unfolding of a process of research, as just one thing leading to another, but seen from a broader perspective, what looked simple will seem to be the result of a chaotic and indeterminate interaction of social and natural forces... and sometimes “mere” chance. It is the difference between trying to follow the theme in the Five Movements for String Quartet by Webern: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HUKM19Oh3d0 and the hook lines of modern “adult contemporary music.”




Penderecki String Quartet. Webern. Five Movements for String Quartet: Movements: 1. Heftig bewegt 2. Sehr langsam
Movements: 3. Sehr bewegt 4. Sehr langsam 5. In zarter bewegung https://youtu.be/C6kFzeZBrds


Webern’s music also emphasizes the importance of silence, or rather a quiet that allows Nature to be heard. It reminds the listener that what is not heard in the music, and in the past, is just as important as what is heard and known. A great deal of our work is in revealing what has been forgotten and lost in the constant work of authority to repress and silence the basis of the present, to naturalize it while assuring us that we are making progress towards the common goal of an enlightened society.

So what is the meaning of Enlightenment? Dare to be Wise! It is as much about an orientation to the world as it is a time period. The Age of Enlightenment had not yet come, Kant wrote, but it was possible to see its' approach in an era where enlightenment had finally become possible. The essay “What is Enlightenment?” is one of the definitive statements on enlightenment and one that you will encounter in many of your readings and in other courses. If you have already discussed it elsewhere, I think that we can perhaps amplify those discussions or perhaps point out some things that might not have been mentioned yet.

Of course, Kant begins with a definition: Enlightenment is the freeing of Man from tutelage or immaturity. And Enlightenment has a motto: Dare to be Wise! or “Have the courage to use your own reason!” Dare to think for yourself, but also dare to be a Wise Man or a Scholar who uses Reason and Philosophy to develop himself (yes, the gendered language is deliberate for that was what they meant. To them, civil society was the domain of men.)

Although we have been freed from the direction of Nature, most of us still live “under life-long tutelage” and so it is easy for some to present themselves as our guardians, as populists..... as they become tyrants. Of course, this means that most of us live under tyranny. To understand this, he suggests we think about how very attractive its to live at the direction of others --- to just do as you are told. And culture itself makes it even more attractive and easier to give one's self over to another:
“If I have a book which understands for me, a physician who decided for my diet, and so forth, I need not trouble myself.”
And in an interesting acknowledgment of how the social relations of capital are very much under consideration:
“I need not think because, so long as I can pay” others willingly take up the task for me.
There are also the guardians, a special class who understand that freedom is dangerous for the common person, and who have “so kindly assumed superintendence over” those who will not think for themselves.

These guardians have trained and treated us like domesticated cattle, and we have become “placid creatures” who “[w]ill not dare take a single step without the harness...”

Most of us will not attempt to free ourselves because of the difficulty of being Enlightened. Enlightenment does not happen all at once, nor does it happen without struggle. It is our fear of initial failures that leads most of us to fall back into the arms of supervision and authority. Being supervised has become, he writes, almost our very nature. But Kant does not think that it is our real nature, which he sees as being free, and he believes that this fear of using our own reason leads us to the kind of supervision and prejudices that result in war. Don't forget, for despite his faults Kant is all about establishing the basis for world peace and individual dignity through the use of Reason.

But it is very difficult for any single individual to break free from supervision. “He has come to be fond of this state” of living under tyranny and besides, in a world in which one is only allowed to think in the laws and formulas of the guardians, the individual never has an opportunity to use her own reason. And even if one had the courage to think, one would not know what to think, since abandoning tutelage is to abandon the familiar ways of making sense of the world.

In an ironic sense, to those still satisfied living under tutelage the free thinker would appear as irrational, not rational. Sort of like a bunch of bourgeois guys in 1776 Philadelphia telling one of the “Great Kings” of Europe that they are free to think for themselves and to start their own nation. It must be remembered that amongst the “Founding Fathers” were prominent enlightenment figures, such as Franklin and Jefferson.  Jefferson’s interests lay not so much in politics as in Natural History, astronomy, farming, and ethics. His one book is a work of Natural History entitled Notes on the State of Virginia and he was engaged with von Humboldt and Buffon. He was one of the first in the Americas to use the Linnean classification scheme. The Jefferson Bible is well worth a look, as he took the New Testament and removed all of the religious portions, leaving a Christ that is not divine but rather a teacher of ethical living reminiscent of Xenophon’s portrayal of Socrates. (I leave it to you to look that reference up!  Here is Jefferson's Bible: http://americanhistory.si.edu/JeffersonBible/the-book/ 

The Declaration of Independence is perhaps the most radical text of Enlightenment ideology with its almost unheard of declaration of an individual's inalienable rights. It goes far beyond anything that Kant could support. Rather than respecting the ruler/authority, Jefferson et al. assert that if any ruler no longer respects those inalienable rights (and they lay out in detail the wrongs suffered by “the People”), “the People” have not just a natural right but an absolute obligation to throw off that ruler and take power for themselves.

Yes, before you say, “but he was a slaver” let me say it first! ( http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/27/arts/design/smithsonian-and-monticello-exhibitions-on-jeffersons-slaves.html?_r=1&ref=arts )
However, just as we find in the present day, deeply flawed people are the norm in history and history has been made by deeply flawed people who did not always know what they were doing or even that they were doing it. This is indeed a relativistic stance and I know that relativism and the deferring of judgment may make many uncomfortable, especially if you believe that there are natural codes of behavior or divinely proscribed commandments. However, if, like Diogenes the Cynic you are searching for purity in the past you will be as disappointed as he would be looking for it in the present.
“It is moral certainty, not tentativeness, that historically has encouraged people to harm or kill others. Genocide, racial and religious persecution, and the rest of the long catalog of political acts that have stained human history can only come from people who are sure that they are right. Only in bad novels and comic books do characters knowingly do evil and boast of it. In life, people rationalize their actions in moral terms...” (Edelman, Constructing the Political Spectacle, 1988:5).
This is certainly no less true for ourselves as it is for Jefferson and so many others. It is worth noting that Kant's “What is Enlightenment?” was published in 1784. Mozart dies in 1791. You know the significant dates in North America at that time.

Anyway, Kant thinks that only a few succeed in breaking free on their own.  Obviously, too, there are lots of possible references back to Plato's cave in the Republic. Although individuals might become enlightened, society can not merely because of these few individuals.

This constraint on enlightenment is overcome by shifting our view away from seeing enlightenment as an individual phenomenon to Enlightenment as a social phenomenon: The Enlightenment of a Public.

This public will throw off the guardians only after a period wherein the public learns to use Reason in the governing of itself, and individuals learn the public use of reason and the obligation/debts of self-discipline. During this time, the public is no doubt susceptible to the prejudices instilled in them over the long period of supervision. They might even turn on the former guardians and inflict the same types of domination that was inflicted on them. “Thus the public can only slowly attain enlightenment” but without freedom, Enlightenment of the public is impossible.

In other words, we must learn to be free and oddly enough we can only do this by restricting our freedom until we learn to use it wisely (rationally).

To Kant --- surrounded by revolutions and the social unrest that can lead to revolution --- most revolutions do not fundamentally change our ideologies and ways of life. It is true that they get rid of despots, but more often one despot simply replaces another:  “new prejudices will serve just as well as old ones to harness the great unthinking masses.” An actual social revolution changes our way of thinking and not just who our leaders are 

We need freedom, he says, but what do we mean by this? Well, it is the freedom to “make the public use of one's reason at every point.” ------ the right to argue with each other, to criticize. It is precisely this freedom that is repressed and this repression preventing the progress of enlightenment.
“But in reality, we hear from corner of society the order ‘Do not argue!’”
Now Kant presents us with four figures from his society that specifically issue this command. They are for us representations of the apparatus of authority during his day: the military, the state bureaucracy, the Church, and the Prince/Tyrant/Leviathan.
First, there is the military officer who says 'Do not argue, but drill!'
Second, the tax collector [who says] 'Do not argue, but pay!'
Third, the Cleric [who says] 'Do not Argue, but believe!'
And there is a fourth one, too, the Prince who says 'Do not argue, but obey!' However, it just so happens that Kant's uniquely Enlightened emperor, Frederick the Great, says “Argue as much as you like, and about what you like, but obey!”

Still, we are left with these four figures of authority:
      Officer
      Tax collector
      Cleric
      Tyrant

and their four commands:
       Drill
       Pay our taxes
       Believe
       Obey

We can not be totally free or ‘go back to nature,’ nor would we want such a return. You have heard the phrase, no doubt, "the wise restraints that make men free” and note its' context as it was coined during the 1930s for the Harvard Law School commencement: “You are ready to aid in the shaping and application of those wise restraints that make men free.” It is not as if the relation between authority/government and knowledge is some secret.

Instead, one hears in this famous dictum the implicit idea that free men are restrained, controlled.... that they must repress a part of themselves in order to be free.

And so if we must have these restrictions, then we must distinguish between those that promote Enlightenment and those that create obstacles to Enlightenment.

And to make this distinction, Kant identifies two modes of Reason, one that is a restricted or private/civil reason as opposed to the public use of reason. This public use of freedom is critical of authority and should therefore be free if the public is to be educated: “The public use of one's reason must always be free, and it alone can bring about enlightenment among men.”

The measure of this freedom is to be found in the existence of a new social representative: the Scholar or the learned/wise man. This person uses Reason when he expresses himself in public as “like a scholar before the reading public.” The enlightened individual acting as a citizen expresses himself as a scholar when critiquing an order, a tax, a belief, or the judgment of the authorities, just as his enlightenment is expressed by his obedience.

If left to ourselves and in freedom, Kant argues, we would become enlightened. It is our nature to become so, but we have created structures that both prevent and encourage enlightenment. Moreover, we can’t be left to alone for we are social animals. Laws, regulations, and restrictions on how one carries out their duties in public office, civil society/business, or private affairs are necessary because, if for no other reason, social labor must be organized and rationally carried out. We can debate how to carry out an industrial/military/civil process both before and after we perform it........ but when it is being performed, we must do our duty.
“The touchstone of everything that can be concluded as a law for a people lies in the question whether the people could have imposed such a law on itself.... and what a people may not decree for itself can even less be decreed for them by a Monarch or tyrant....Men work themselves gradually out of barbarity if only intentional artifices are not made to hold them in it.”
This free thinking effects the “character of the people” who as a result gradually become capable of self-government because this freedom promotes “the principles of government” itself. So that government comes to treat humans in accordance with their dignity, and not as machines or instruments of production (as in Aristotle). So Kant asks, do we live in an Age of Enlightenment? And his answer is a definitive “No.” We live in an age of Enlightenment, by which he means an age where everything must submit to criticism.

But then Kant concludes by turning his praise to his Emperor, the one who says “Argue as much as you want and about what you want, but obey!”

And finally he confronts a paradox. The more civil freedom/private freedom, the greater are the restrictions on the use Reason, the less civil freedom, the more likely the individual can develop into a fully rational human.

Now let’s turn to first to what can be thought of as a companion short essay entitled “What is Orientation in Thinking?” Kant concludes with the following paragraph and long footnote:
Friends of the human race and of all that it holds most sacred! Accept whatever seems most credible to you after careful and honest examination, whether it is a matter of facts or of rational arguments; but do not deny reason that prerogative which makes it the greatest good on earth, namely its right to be the ultimate touchstone of truth.* If you fail in this respect, you will be unworthy of this freedom and will surely forfeit it; and you will bring the same misfortune don upon those other guiltless souls who would otherwise have been inclined to employ their freedom lawfully and hence in a manner conducive to the world’s best interests!
[Footnote] *To think for oneself means to look within oneself (i.e., in one’s own reason) for the supreme touchstone of truth; and the maxim of thinking for oneself at all times is enlightenment. Now this requires less effort than is imagined by those who equate enlightenment with knowledge, for enlightenment consists rather in a negative principle in the use of one’s cognitive powers, and those who are exceedingly rich in knowledge are often least enlightened in their use of it. To employ one’s own reason means simply to ask oneself, whenever one is urged to accept something, whether one finds it possible to transform the reason for accepting it, or the rule which follows from what is accepted, into a universal principle governing the use of one’s reason. Everyone can apply this test to himself; and when it is carried out, superstition and zealotry will be seen to vanish immediately, even if the individual in question does not have nearly enough knowledge to refute them on objective grounds. For he is employing the maxim of the self-preservation of reason. It is consequently very easy to lay the basis of enlightenment in individual subjects by means of education; one must merely begin at an early stage to accustom young minds to this reflection. To enlighten an era, however, is a very protracted process; for there are numerous external obstacles which either preclude that mode of education or make it more difficult to implement (Kant, “What is Orientation in Thinking?” from Political Writings, 1786:249).
The other aspects of Enlightenment come together in this use of reason:

Reason
Nature / Natural History
the Individual
Nations
the Market and social contract
Human Rights
Universal History
Progress
Freedom
Progress and domination
The naturalizing of the social world and the social domination of nature

Reason can understand Nature; nature is not divine but a world of systems, logics, unfoldings (the original meaning of “evolution”) and progressions with a deep past, and hence the study of nature would be called Natural History. Reason is the property of all Individuals who express themselves through language (in Cultural Studies, “language” is always understood as referring to speech, texts, visual signs, gestures, etc.). Individuals enter into relations with each other through a Social Contract which is the basis of the Market as a sphere of exchange between individuals --- and the Supreme Court recently reminded us that a corporation is an individual, too. The contract assumes the existence of certain universal individual rights. The entire history of society moves in one direction, and all societies are directed towards a single goal: the realization of these universal rights. All Nations will develop through the same stages, until they all reach the highest stage of perfection in the achievement of universal rights for all individuals. This Universal History has at its core is the concept of Progress.

Progress was the most revolutionary concept of a rising bourgeoisie that embraced carried forward the ideology of an age of Enlightenment. As Ernst Cassirer wrote, albeit a bit romantically because of his affinity to that rising bourgeois class “...[the Enlightenment] thirst for knowledge and intellectual curiosity are directed not only toward the external world; the thought of this age is even more passionately impelled by that other question” i.e., the question of Man. “Pope gave brief and pregnant expression to this deep-seated feeling of the age in the line ‘The proper study of mankind is man.’” The Enlightenment “senses that a new force is at work within it, but it is even more fascinated by the activity of this force than by the creations brought forth by that activity. It rejoices not only in results, but it inquires into, and attempts to explain, the form of the process leading to these results. The problem of intellectual ‘progress’... appears in this light. Perhaps no other century is so completely permeated by the idea of intellectual progress as that of the Enlightenment.” While we see many different expressions of this in many branches of knowledge and in varied technological advances, these all converge for Cassirer:
“All the various energies of the mind are... held together in a common center of force. Variety and diversity of shapes are simply the full unfolding of an essentially homogeneous formative power. When the eighteenth century wants to characterize this power in a single word, it calls it ‘reason.’ ‘Reason’ become the unifying central point of this century, expressing all that it longs and strives for, and all that it achieves.... The eighteenth century is imbued with a belief in the unity and immutability of reason. Reason is the same for all thinking subjects, all nations, all epochs, and all cultures.” (The Philosophy of the Enlightenment. Boston: Beacon, 1951:4-7.)

Cassirer uses terms like “mind” and “feeling of the age” to avoid the more accurate concept that we will use: ideology.

With Enlightenment comes a disenchantment of Nature, a turning of Nature into a thing or commodity for exploitation. But one of the scientific breakthroughs of the Enlightenment was the decentering of humans in relation to the natural world. Humans were placed within nature and Natural History flourished through its attention to the place of humans in the natural order. This is of course epitomized by Linneaus’ System of Nature, which not only gave us our modern system of classifying plants and animals, but also placed humans in the natural order for the first time. It is at this moment that you can have Man as “the proper subject of study.” Nietzsche certainly pointed this out to us as well, but without the conservatism of Cassirer:
To breed an animal with the right to make promises --- is not this the paradoxical task that nature has set itself in the case of man? Is it not the real problem regarding man? ....To ordain the future in advance in this way, man must first have learned to distinguish necessary events from chance ones, to think causally, to see and anticipate eventualities as if they belong to the present, to decide with certainty what is the goal and what the means to it, and in general be able to calculate and compute. Man himself first of all have become calculable, regular, necessary, even in his own image of himself, if he is to be able to stand security for his own future which is what one who promises does! (Genealogy of Morals. New York: Vintage. 1967:57-58.)
There is the view in Cultural Studies, which is drawn directly from Horkheimer and Adorno, that we use the same rationality to exploit and repress the nature that is inside of ourselves just as we exploit and repress that the nature that we have reduced to a mere object. There is, the Frankfurt School further argued, a pervasive sado-masochism in the everyday life of the social relations of capital. This brings us to our other text for today: “Juliette or Enlightenment and Morality” from Dialectic of Enlightenment.

Part II: 
Juliette, Morality and the Social Relations of Capital.

“From Kant’s Critique to Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals, the hand of philosophy had traced the writing on the wall, but one individual put that writing into practice, in all its details. The work of the Marquis de Sade exhibits ‘understanding without direction from another’ --- that is to say, the bourgeois subject freed from all tutelage.” - Horkheimer in Dialectic of Enlightenment.


This chapter from Dialectic of Enlightenment was written by Horkheimer. There is no record that Adorno directly contributed to it. The excursus attempts to demonstrate that at the heart of the bourgeois world is a domain of freedom but also of cruelty. This is the paradox of western society, or of any modern society where the social relations of capital prevail. The technologies that are essential aspects of these relations are embedded within a whole set of social relations which can literally be seen in Sade: technologies of pleasure and arrangements of bodies around a machine that both satisfies and produces desire. It can also be seen in the positions of the Explorer and the prisoner, the guard, the superintendent, etc. in Kafka's Penal Colony. These relations themselves are not static, but have their own histories.

Into hands stained by the murder of spouses and children, sodomy, killing, prostitution, and infamy, heaven has placed these riches to reward me for such abominations.
Horkheimer quotes this line from Sade because it describes the benefits of modern life. It may be exaggerated, but that exaggeration does not rob it of its insight. We have been rewarded by history with our lifestyle (something to consider as you sit in front of a computer right now). If all the world is a stage, then the world is also a theater of cruelty in a very real sense: “...when power was at stake, the rulers have piled up mountains of corpses even in recent centuries.” (Dialectic of Enlightenment, 91)

How might this be understood? Well, first we must remember that the Enlightenment, the rise of the Bourgeoisie, and the rise of capital can not be separated. They depended upon each other Think again about Kant's famous statement on the meaning of Enlightenment and the central themes in the ideology of Enlightenment.

There is a great coherence to this view. It is this coherence that makes it quite attractive. It presents the enlightened person as the object of progress, as an individual who is courageous and rational. It also describes an entire transformation in the understanding of the relationship between Society and Nature, and between human and human.

Now this courage that Kant refers to is a special quality that has been carefully cultivated. It is not the wild courage often associated with the battlefield, but one that belongs to a new kind of human: the individual. The Enlightened individual becomes such because they are courageous in their wise use of Reason. They are no longer under the guidance of another, but free to think for themselves. Thinking for yourself --- even thinking that you are a unified self--- is a new phenomenon, he says, and most people fear such a moment of emancipation especially when the alternative is the comfort of the established order. This courage is a quality that can potentially belong to everyone, but in practical terms belongs only to a few who know how to use it. One might say that this is still the case, which is why Kant says we live in an age of Enlightenment, but not in an enlightened age.

Along with this freedom, though, come new obligations:  the obligations of an Enlightened Individual no longer under the yoke of feudal lords or the Church. This new freedom must be exercised with a certain restraint, for one is allowed such freedom of thought only under an Emperor Frederick, and so Enlightenment should also make one realize that a certain debt is owed to the authority which allows such freedom of thought and action. Enlightenment, then, is not just about freedom and progress. But whether it is freedom or obligation, everything refers back to Reason. Kant advised that we stop at the point where Reason threatens the social order and thus the conditions for its own existence. There is, Horkheimer says, the possibility that Reason through its very success will come to threaten its own existence. The progressive rationalization of life through authority, science, and bureaucracy threatens the freedom upon which Reason is based. The rationalization of life deprives Nature of any meaning except as a material for rational exploitation (e. g., “wild life management,” “forest stewardship,” etc.). Rationalization comes to threaten life itself by making Nature and humans into objects for study and use. The disenchantment of Nature, as Max Weber referred to it.

The long paragraph from pages 68-70 is the heart of Horkheimer’s argument about nature being transformed into an object and what that means for our understanding of our own social relations:

For the rulers, however, human beings become mere material, as the whole of nature has become material for society. After the brief interlude of liberalism in which the bourgeois kept each other in check, power is revealing itself as archaic terror in a fascistically rationalized form.
Now Horkheimer quotes from Juliette:

The religious chimeras,’ says the Prince of Francavilla at the court of the King of Naples,‘must be replaced by utmost terror. The people must be freed form the fear of a future Hell. Once that is destroyed they will abandon themselves to anything. But that chimerical fear must be replaced by penal laws of enormous severity, which apply, of course, only to the people, since they alone cause unrest in the state. Malcontents are born only to the lower classes. What do the rich care for the idea of a leash they will never feel themselves, if this empty semblance gives them the right to grind down those living under their yoke? You will find no one in that class who will not permit the darkest shadow of tyranny to fall on him, provided it really falls on others.’
And then Horkheimer draws a comparison between Sade, a rationality that governs even our leisure time, and sports.

“Reason is the organ of calculation, of planning; it is neutral with regard to ends; its element is coordination. More than a century before the emergence of sport, Sade demonstrated empirically what Kant grounded transcendentally: the affinity between knowledge and planning which has set its stamp on inescapable functionality on a bourgeois existence rationalized even in its breathing spaces. The precisely coordinated modern sporting squad, in which no member is in doubt over his role and a replacement is held ready for each,” [not unlike any factory or corporation---BRBIII] “has its exact counterpart in the sexual teams of Juliette, in which no moment is unused, no body orifice neglected, no function left inactive. In sport, as in all branches of mass culture, a tense purposive bustle prevails, although none but the wholly initiated observer could fathom the different combinations or the meaning of the games changing fortunes, governed by arbitrarily chosen rules. The special architectonics structure of the Kantian system, like the gymnasts’ pyramids in Sades Orgies and the formalized principles of early bourgeois freemasonry --- cynically reflected in the strict regime of the libertine societies of the 120 Days of Sodom --- prefigures the organization, devoid of any substantial goals, which was to encompass the whole of life. What seems to matter in such events, more than pleasure itself, is the busy pursuit of pleasure, its organization....

‘Just so,’ replies the Prince in Sade to the speaker just quoted, ‘the government itself must control the population. It must possess the means to exterminate the people, should it fear them, or to increase their numbers, should it consider that necessary. And nothing should weigh in the balance of its justice excepts its own interests or passions, together only with the passions and interests of those who, as we have said, have been granted just enough power to multiply our own.’ The Prince points the path which imperialism, reason in its most terrible form, has always followed. ‘Take away its god from the people you wish to subjugate, and you will demoralize it’ [Meaning not only psychological depression, but the destruction of morality in general--- BRBIII] ‘As long as it has no other god than yours, you will always be its master ... Grant it in return the widest, most criminal license. Never punish it, except when it turns against you.’
We are all children of the Enlightenment. Through Reason comes both self-understanding and an understanding of the world. The ability to understand ones' own nature, too. It is the individual who uses this Reason. These individuals are, as they are self-aware, able to enter into contracts (agreements, covenants, etc.) with each other: to give and receive obligations. Thus the market is the sum of these obligations at least as seen by the bourgeoisie. And as Marx pointed out, the "Market" is really an abstract or “alienated” representation of the social relations of real people. The invisible hand is in fact our inability or unwillingness to make visible the exchanges between individuals.

For most of us, it just seems that the domain of Reason expands as the accumulation of knowledge ---and capital--- increases. Life gets “better.” Progress is assured for the individual, the nation, and the species. With Enlightenment comes the ideology of individualism comes as well a recognition that some share certain habits or customs which set them apart from others. For example, some share a more “advanced” way of life. The community, nation, or “people” follow the same path of development that the individual does. The development of the individual seemingly recapitulates the development of the species, as the progress of nations recapitulates the expansion of our species's domination of nature.

Now, perhaps the most positive aspect of Enlightenment is the belief in the universality of the ideology of progress. Enlightenment may begin in one place, but it is the birth right of all humans. Behind our ideology of inalienable rights is the idea of progress, of all humans progressing through the same stages of development, and of the world itself becoming Enlightened.

It is out of this ideological formation that the “disciplines” -- i. e., the current disciplining of the producers and accumulators of knowledge -- arise. It is knowledge and culture, after all, that we are always told drive the motor of progress.

All of this sounds great. Who is against electricity or modern medicine? Who would want polio to return? Few would want to return to those romanticized societies of the past where only the Ruler held the power of life and death. As Michael Wood of “Hitler's Search...” once said “Throughout history the priest and the executioner have walked hand in hand.”

This leads us back to the place we started. The wealth and benefits that we take for granted come to us as much through blood and cruelty as through kindness and empathy. Much our social, intellectual, and artistic labor involves the creation and maintenance of what are in reality systems of cruelty and terror (“weapons systems,” “missile defense systems,” “delivery systems,” as well as networks, communities, social movements, and of course, the Market) all of which are assumed to be “only for defense.” From the renaming of the War Department to the Department of Defense to the Cold War's doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction to yet another year of the Terror War, we have become quite comfortable with being terrorized. “It is just the way things are.” “It is just the way the world is.” However, to look at terror only in the context of the last 60 years would be to miss the point. What Sade shows us is that terror has been there from the beginning of the bourgeois era, that it indeed defines that era just as much as Reason, progress and enlightenment. If not the priest and the executioner, then terror and reason have been partners since the emergence of Enlightenment. This is the value of Sade’s critique of Reason.

“The Enlightenment of the modern age has been marked from the first by radicalism....” Horkheimer writes, “Juliette’s credo is science. She abominates any veneration which can not be shown to be rational: belief in God and his dead son, obedience to the Ten Commandments, preference of the good to the wicked, salvation to sin....The dark writers of the bourgeoisie, unlike its apologists, did not seek to avert the consequences of the Enlightenment....when power was a stake, the rulers have piled up mountains of corpses even in recent centuries.”
If one needs an more example, then certainly look no further than the rationality of cruelty displayed in our legalistic and rationalistic justification for torturing prisoners captured in the Terror War; torture that takes place in our own penal colony. (See http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/02/washington/02terror.html?ref=washington
and listen to the first part of this Brian Leherer show http://www.wnyc.org/shows/bl/episodes/2008/04/02.

To find the relationship between terror and Reason, look at the next set of slides below. These feature, on the very surface, the rationalization of torture and its aesthetic. Think about the amount of time and deliberation that went towards devising these artifacts. Think about the constellation of social forces necessary for these to be deployed and used on the bodies of human beings like yourself: the church, the state, the legal profession, the medical knowledge necessary, too. The philosophical rationalizations (no pun intended), the manufacturing knowledge and industrial techniques, the aesthetic sensibility, and the quest for truth are all here, as well. It is this quest for truth that powers progress, but the interrogators, despite their rationality, do not have access to truth except through the body of the prisoner or simply use the prisoner’s own body to “carry out the sentence” as Kafka describes in his Penal Colony, which we will examine in a couple of weeks.

The slides before you today are primarily from two sources. The first, the Constituto Criminalis Theresiana was written in 1768 in an attempt to rationalize punishment. (You can read the work here: http://www.archive.org/details/ConstitutioCriminalisTheresiana-1768) Every detail was noted and devises measured so that equality of punishment would be possible. It was considered a work of liberal penal theory. It is also a work of aesthetics. And as we see in many of the devises, a great deal of attention was paid to the aesthetics of the instrument of torture and to the choreography of the torturers. The instruments had to be constructed so as to ensure that the same punishment was being meted out everywhere within the empire. Not only the trial procedure, but the procedures of punishment had to be rationalized and normalized. But again, there was also an aestheticisation of the instruments. The Pear, the Iron Maiden and the “collar & weight” depicted below are obvious examples. Just as today, Reason in the form of design, science, and technology, is just as often put to work in the repression of freedom as in the task of emancipation.

If there are two poles of the use of Reason, then Frederick and Theresa stand as appropriate representatives, along with Sade.

The second source is Inquisition/Inquisición: A Bilingual Guide to the exhibition of Torture Instruments from the Middle Ages to the Industrial Era, Presented in Various European Cities. Photographs by Marcello Bertoni. 1985. Florence, Italy: Qua d'Arno. The title almost speaks for itself.

I have also added some illustrations from the history of slavery because the same instruments that were being used on the "degenerates" of Europe were also deployed on the bodies of its other “instruments of production.”

Notice that the idea was often to punish and to maim, but not necessarily to kill. Whether the idea was the the former or the later, the maximum amount of thought went into devising the most painful and degrading punishments. This is what Juliette's research reveals. It is no wonder that the worse punishments awaited the heretic, the woman, the homosexual, etc. The very fact that we can find these objects in popular culture, in everyday speech --- “being grilled,” or “being put on the rack,” or “being crucified,” or jokes about “chastity belts” --- that should make us take seriously Nietzsche's remark, echoed later by Freud, that though repressed, the memory of socialization has been burned into us. And we know that whatever has been repressed can not be repressed indefinitely.

“The human being, in the process of his emancipation, shares the fate of the rest of his world. Domination of nature involves domination of man. Each subject not only has to take part in the subjugation of external nature, human and nonhuman, but in order to do so must subjugate nature in himself. Domination becomes 'internalized' for domination's sake....the kinds of weapons or machines that man uses at the various stages of his evolution call for certain forms of command and obedience, of co-operation and subordination, and thus are effective also in bringing into being certain legal, artistic, and religious forms.” ---Max Horkheimer, “The Revolt of Nature” (1947:93 and 103).

Walter Benjamin perhaps captured some of the seeming paradox of the emergence of cultural critique in his description of Klee's Angelus Novus, which was a present to him by the artist and in Benjamin's constant possession until his death. His description was written just before his death in the Pyrenees as he fled the advance of the Nazis.

“A Klee painting named ‘Angelus Novus’ shows an angel looking as though he is about to move away from something he is fixedly contemplating. His eyes are staring, his mouth is open, his wings are spread. This is how one pictures the angel of history. His face is turned toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage and hurls it in front of his feet. The angel would like to stay, awaken the dead, and make whole what has been smashed. But a storm is blowing in from Paradise; it has got caught in his wings with such violence that the angel can no longer close them. This storm irresistibly propels him into the future to which his back is turned, while the pile of debris before him grows skyward. This storm is what we call progress.”  ---Walter Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of History, IX (1940).
NOTE: The performance artist Laurie Anderson used this quote 
from Benjamin for her song “The Dream Before” 
(a.k.a., “Progress”):
or watch a 2001 live performance here:

This is a statement that is often pointed to as important to understanding the views that gave rise to Cultural Studies. Because you can bet that there are other interpretations out there that are no less concerned with questions of power and the meaning of culture. For example, those that Critical Theory arose in opposition and resistance to... interpretations such as this one:



The introduction of Inquisition/Inquisición ends with these words: “The Roman saying of homo hominibus lupus, 'man is a wolf to men,' is a vile calumny of wolves.... Probably the last survivor of the human race will be some torture victim in an underground cell beyond the reach of radiation.”

Over the next three weeks we will look into some of the other tendencies and ideas that came together in Cultural Studies, such as Borges, Kafka, Freud, and the study of popular culture. Then we will turn to the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School, Stuart Hall and the Birmingham School, and the American Reception.





 












  Theresa and Frederick II 
 Alessandro Magnasco
The Inquisition or (Interrogations in a Jail) (1710-1720) 
 





(The Establishment of Criminal Inquiries, 1769.)




Thumbscrews, from the Constituto Criminalis Theresiana.







Shin Breaker in use, from the Constituto Criminalis Theresiana.


















The Pendulum. 1500s-1700s from the Constituto Criminalis Theresiana.




















Illustrations of machines of pleasure from Sade's Julliette





Interrogation chair, 17th century original. Florence, Italy.







The Garrotte, remained in use in Spain until the fall of Franco in 1975.




Iron Maiden of Nuremberg, 18th Century copy of 15th century original.


Head Crusher, Venice, 1500-1700.
Cotton Mill, United States, 19th Century

The use of everyday objects is also notable in these cultural artifacts. Many of the technologies are simply converted for use on humans. For example, the cotton mill was an industrial device which was easily converted into a torture devise. This means that even when it was being used to mill cotton rather than swing bodies, its existence served as a constant reminder of its other uses. One could be both put to work “at the mill with slaves” and tortured on the mill with slaves. The lack of choice masquerading as real alternatives remains with us in the false choice of consumer products and our devotion to earning the money to exchange for those commodities.














AN INSTRUMENT OF TORTURE AMONG SLAVEHOLDERS.
ON this page we publish an illustration of an INSTRUMENT OF TORTURE used among the slave-holders of Missouri. The correspondent who sends us the sketch writes MONTGOMERY CITY. MISSOURI, January 24, 1862.
I send you the sketch of an instrument used by the secession slave-masters of Missouri to punish their Negroes. Not long since one of these wretched victims came within our lines with an instrument of this description round his neck. It was securely riveted there, and required an hour's filing before it could be removed. This proved to be a very painful operation to the poor "contraband;" for his neck was so snugly encased by the iron band, and the instrument was of such a peculiar shape, as to render the operation difficult of accomplishment. The negro stated that he had worn it two months, and this statement has been corroborated by reliable Union men at the same county. The form of the instrument prevented him from lying down and taking his rest at night; and its weight and close fit rendered it very burdensome during the day. It consisted of a heavy iron ring, fitting closely round the neck, from which extended three prongs, each two feet in length, with a ring on the end. I suppose the design of the instrument was that a chain should be attached to it, and thus secure the victim beyond all possible hope of escape; but this negro had been running loose, with the thing round his neck, for two months; and finally, ascertaining that Federal soldiers were near, speedily repaired to them for deliverance from his tormentor. Of course he found the deliverance which he sought, and the instrument of torment is preserved by us as a mournful example of the deep degradation to which the soul, tainted by secession, may descend. It is needless to say that we did not send the negro back to his master, but so far as we were concerned, left him perfectly free to do his own will. The name of the person who has thus proved himself destitute of all humanity is Dudley Wells, of Montgomery County, Missouri. He is now a prisoner, held as a traitor to his country, and awaiting the punishment due his crime; and if he does not receive it at an earthly tribunal he certainly will at the tribunal of an outraged conscience.
Sergeant CHARLES O. DEWEY,
Dodge's Battery, 4th Regiment Iowa Volunteers.

From:Harper's Weekly, February 15, 1862
http://www.sonofthesouth.net/leefoundation/civil-war/1862/february/slave-torture.htm


The Punishment Collar with dead weight (a.k.a. ball and chain), 1500-c.1860. Together, they weigh twenty-seven pounds. Death usually was the result of infections from the abrasion of the neck and shoulders.



Ball and Chain, Europe, America, and Popular Culture








The Chastity Belt, Venice, 17th -19th Century throughout Europe.





The Oral, Rectal, and Vaginal Pear, Venice, 1575-1700s.







Water Torture (Water boarding) 1500's to the present. Currently authorized for use by the American government.  Illustrations from Europe, Philippines, Vietnam, and the United States.












Branks, or Scold's Bridles, Northern Europe and Germany. 1600-1800.
Made entirely of sheet iron. Used on slaves in the New World until 1800s.























Brazil
by
Terry Gilliam







  Next Lecture -
 Borges: Fragments, Dreams   
 & the Meaning of Tradition