Showing posts with label Foucault. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Foucault. Show all posts

Saturday, March 17, 2012

Lecture 7 (notes): The Frankfurt School and Cultural Studies

Notes and Slides for Lecture Seven:  
The Frankfurt School and Cultural Studies
Text of lecture to be added in the course of time.




Max Horkheimer on the Origins of Critical Theory.
http://www.archive.org/details/RicBrownMaxHorkheimeronCriticalTheory








Theodor Adorno on Popular Music and Protest. 
http://www.archive.org/details/RicBrownTheordorAdornoonPopularMusicandProtest









Tuesday, February 7, 2012

Lecture Three - Borges: Fragments, Dreams, and the Meaning of Tradition - Part I


Lecture Three - 
Jorge Luis Borges: Fragments, Dreams, and the Meaning of Tradition

(Part I)

[DRAFT currently being updated- last updated 01.20.2020 - Part II to be added.]


It is difficult to write about Borges. Much like The Approach to Al-Mu'tasim there is a "hybridization" or "a rather uncomfortable combination of those allegorical poems of Islam which rarely fail to interest their translator and of those detective novels which inevitably surpass John H. Watson and refine the horror of human life found in the most irreproachable boarding houses of Brighton." There is no one approach or point of departure for examining his work and its significance for Cultural Studies. In fact, the difficulty of approach, or rather the multiplicity of possible approaches to Borges mirrors the multiplicity of possible approaches to the genealogy of Cultural Studies. Perhaps it is interesting to note that it is easier to speak about Borges than it is to write about him. In any event, we shall give it a try. Borges the person we will leave to the biographers and focus for the most part on Borges the author, as he suggested.

Why read Borges in the context of a genealogy of Cultural Studies? Well, first of all, keep in mind that we do not examine literatures, objects, or sounds as mere critics. Instead, these constitute objects of study whose construction and interpretation may give us some insight into our own existence. They are artifacts rather than aesthetic objects. While I have always found Borges to be a uniquely appealing writer, that is not why he is included in the genealogy of Cultural Studies that I am presenting to you.

Among the reasons to read Borges are the influence his work had on, for example, Michel Foucault and his views on the author, authority, and critical analysis; the themes which circulate freely across Borges’ works are precursors of many of the themes we later find in Cultural Studies and related fields; his simultaneous marginality and cosmopolitanism. So we will try to take up some of these up leitmotifs, but much will be left unsaid and unexamined --- all of which is up to you to pursue further. Perhaps a course devoted to Borges would be appropriate....

For our approach to Borges, we will begin with three short texts: Borges and I, The Other, and Kafka and his Precursors. The first of these is a parable and the last an examination of a writer known for his parables and stories wherein one finds parables within parables or stories within stories, as we find in the Homeric epics and the Thousand and One Nights, which Borges refers to in many of his stories and poems.

The text of Borges and I is brief:
The other one, the one called Borges, is the one things happen to. I walk through the streets of Buenos Aires and stop for a moment, perhaps mechanically now, to look at the arch of an entrance hall and the grillwork on the gate; I know of Borges from the mail and see his name on a list of professors or in a biographical dictionary. I like hourglasses, maps, eighteenth-century typography, the taste of coffee and the prose of Stevenson; he shares these preferences, but in a vain way that turns them into the attributes of an actor. It would be an exaggeration to say that ours is a hostile relationship; I live, let myself go on living, so that Borges may contrive his literature, and this literature justifies me. It is no effort for me to confess that he has achieved some valid pages, but those pages cannot save me, perhaps because what is good belongs to no one, not even to him, but rather to the language and to tradition. Besides, I am destined to perish, definitively, and only some instant of myself can survive in him. Little by little, I am giving over everything to him, though I am quite aware of his perverse custom of falsifying and magnifying things.

Spinoza knew that all things long to persist in their being; the stone eternally wants to be a stone and the tiger a tiger. I shall remain in Borges, not in myself (if it is true that I am someone), but I recognize myself less in his books than in many others or in the laborious strumming of a guitar. Years ago I tried to free myself from him and went from the mythologies of the suburbs to the games with time and infinity, but those games belong to Borges now and I shall have to imagine other things. Thus my life is a flight and I lose everything and everything belongs to oblivion, or to him.

I do not know which of us has written this page. -- Jorge Luis Borges, Borges and I (complete text).

The identity of Borges or any other author/producer with a work, and indeed the very unity of the self/individual are both called into question in this parable. The two (or more) Borges are clearly growing more distant from each other. The one writes, he exists and experiences the world, but the other one, “the one called Borges is the one things happen to. I walk... look.... understand” and while Borges shares these passions, his passion is not genuine because his is made of words and interpretations. Things happen to one while they are recounted or mythologized by the other: “I live, let myself go on living, so that Borges may contrive his literature, and this literature justifies me.” The text does not actually bestow immortality to the one who is “destined to perish.” The one who is writes will “return to language and tradition.” Words and interpretations, not quite immortality; a virtual or dreamworld where “everything belongs to oblivion or to him.” The ambiguity of the final sentence brings to the fore the problem of the author, intention, and who has the authority to determine the meaning of a work.

This fragmented self is to be found in our second text from Borges' The Other. The story begins: “It was in Cambridge. Back in February, 1969, that the event took place.” The event was the meeting of the seventy year old Borges with his 20 year old self; the younger Borges in Geneva just after the horrors of World War I and the older Borges in Cambridge just after the events of 1968. Except that time and space are both compressed in the story into a few moments in one place:
I said straight out ‘your name is Jorge Luis Borges. I, too, am Jorge Luis Borges. This is 1969 and we’re in the City of Cambridge.’

‘No,’ he said in a voice that was mine but a bit removed. He paused, then became insistent. ‘I’m here in Geneva, on a bench, a few steps away from the Rhone. The strange thing is that we resemble each other, but you’re much older and your hair is gray.’

They debate whether they are dreaming each other. They explore knowledge that only they share or will share, but having that knowledge is not enough to convince either of them of the existence of the other while at the same time neither doubts the reality of his own existence. In the end

Each of us was a caricature copy of he other.... Either to offer advice or to argue was pointless since, unavoidably, it was his fate to become the person I am.

We goodbye without touching each other.... I have brooded a great deal over that meeting, which until now I have related to no one. I believe I have discovered the key. The meeting was real but the other man was dreaming when he conversed with me, and this explains how he was able to forget me. I conversed with him while awake and the memory of it disturbs me. The other man dreamed me, but he did not dream me exactly.
Borges appears as the one who “knows... walks....understands” and as Borges the author, but additionally Borges the dreamer of a figure and as a figure in the dream of another. In other words, the one who experiences, the one who exists as a trace in others, and the Borges of the unconscious of the dreams of many dreamers. What exists in the imagination is no less real for Borges than the aspects of the physical world that present themselves to our limited sensory apparatus. As with dreams, so too with texts. It is enough, Borges maintained, that a book merely be imagined for it to exist. (See, for example, the story The Secret Miracle.) Dreams here are not approached in terms of the sort of vulgar Freudianism that now pervades everyday life, as we are not delving into dreams as disclosing some individual psyche or even a collective unconscious, because there are no such unities in Borges. Dreams here are approached in a manifestly pre-Freudian sense that can be found in such diverse texts as Charles Brockden Brown’s novel Edgar Huntly, or, Memoirs of a Sleep Walker (1799):
Proceeding irresolutely and slowly forward, my hands at length touched a wall. This, like the flooring, was of stone, and was rugged and impenetrable. I followed this wall. An advancing angle occurred at a short distance, which was followed by similar angles. I continued to explore this clue, till the suspicion occurred that I was merely going round the walls of a vast and irregular apartment.

The utter darkness disabled me from comparing directions and distances. This discovery, therefore, was not made on a sudden, and was still entangled with some doubt. My blood recovered some warmth, and my muscles some elasticity; but in proportion as my sensibility returned, my pains augmented. Overpowered by my fears and my agonies, I desisted from my fruitless search, and sat down, supporting my back against the wall.

My excruciating sensations for a time occupied my attention. These, in combination with other causes, gradually produced a species of delirium. I existed, as it were, in a wakeful dream. With nothing to correct my erroneous perceptions, the images of the past occurred in capricious combinations and vivid hues. Methought I was the victim of some tyrant who had thrust me into a dungeon of his fortress, and left me no power to determine whether he intended I should perish with famine, or linger out a long life in hopeless imprisonment. Whether the day was shut out by insuperable walls, or the darkness that surrounded me was owing to the night and to the smallness of those crannies through which daylight was to be admitted, I conjectured in vain.

Sometimes I imagined myself buried alive. Methought I had fallen into seeming death, and my friends had consigned me to the tomb, from which a resurrection was impossible. That, in such a case, my limbs would have been confined to a coffin, and my coffin to a grave, and that I should instantly have been suffocated, did not occur to destroy my supposition. Neither did this supposition overwhelm me with terror or prompt my efforts at deliverance. My state was full of tumult and confusion, and my attention was incessantly divided between my painful sensations and my feverish dreams.....

The sound of my voice made him start and exclaim, 'Am I alive? am I awake? Speak again, I beseech you, and convince me that I am not dreaming or delirious.'
 or a footnote from William James’ The Principles of Psychology:
The world of dreams is our real world whilst we are sleeping, because our attention then lapses from the sensible world. Conversely, when we wake the attention usually lapses from the dream-world and that becomes unreal. But if a dream haunts us and compels our attention during the day it is very apt to remain figuring in our consciousness as a sort of sub-universe alongside the waking world. Most people have probably had dreams which it is hard to imagine not to have been glimpses into an actually existing region of being, perhaps a corner of the ‘spiritual world.’ And dreams have accordingly in all ages been regarded as revelations, and have played a large part in furnishing forth mythologies and creating themes for faith to lay hold upon. The ‘larger universe,’ here, which helps us to believe both in the dream and in the waking reality which is its immediate reductive, is the total universe, of Nature plus the Supernatural. The dream holds true, namely, in one half of that universe; the waking perceptions the other half. Even today dream-objects figure among the realities in which some ‘psychic-researchers’ are seeking to rouse our belief. All our theories, not only those about the supernatural, but our philosophic and scientific theories as well, are like our dreams in rousing such different degrees of belief in different minds. -- William James. The Principles of Psychology, Volumes One and Two, 1890. Dover Press edition, 1950, Vol. II., pg. 294.

One finds James mentioned frequently in the pages of Borges, and using James, Borges offers us a way through this maze of shifting simulacrums in the short piece Kafka and his Precursors where we can see his own approach to one of his favorite authors --- and one whom we will discuss in the next lecture. It also introduces Borges’ approaches to "intertextuality" and to the "death of the author."

Borges writes that he finds Kafka in the pages of other writers. That if Kafka had never written, the elements that we associate with the Kafkaesque would still be with us. But we don’t see Kafka’s precursors as precursors until we know Kafka. Until then, they would seem to have no Kafkaesque themes. By looking for his precursors, we reread their works as having elements that we would otherwise recognize by a different author’s name, if we even named them. At the same time, even if Kafka’s executor had burned his work, Kafka would still have existed, would still have composed the stories that we can read back into other texts. Trees fall unheard in the forest all of the time, after all.

When we read a text, we are bringing to that reading all of the other texts we have read, knowledge that we have accumulated, experience, commentaries by others, etc. and bringing these to a reading, Borges maintains, amounts to a re reading or even rewriting of the text. That the engagement of the reader with the text is not an engagement with the author (assuming we could hold that figure steady for more than an instant), but the creation of a new variation of the text.

Borges finds Kafka in the following texts, which means that Borges reread these texts as precursors to Kafka, whether or not Kafka did or they intended to invent Kafka. [In a similar manner Umberto Eco, whose essay we will read in a couple of weeks, says that he created the pop writer Dan Brown and that Dan Brown is just a character from his novel.] Of course, Kafka exists elsewhere, too, in fact, in Kafka we can find a Precursor and contemporary of Borges, but Borges finds Kafka in:
Zeno’s paradoxes
http://www.iep.utm.edu/zeno-par/

Han Yu, who famously united writing and ethics, through the French work Anthologie raisonnee de la litterature chinoise, by Margoulies (1948)

Lowrie’s Kierkegaard
Lowrie was the principle translator of Kierkegaard’s works into English

Lord (Edward John Moreton) Dunsay Carassonne from his book A Dreamer’s Tales

And finally this poem by Browning where a monster, an imaginary being, a dreamer, and possibly god appear and disappear, with its' hints of Kafka's The Trial or Memoirs of a Dog.

Robert Browning Fears and Scruples
Fears And Scruples
Here's my case. Of old I used to love him.
This same unseen friend, before I knew:
Dream there was none like him, none above him,--
Wake to hope and trust my dream was true.

Loved I not his letters full of beauty?
Not his actions famous far and wide?
Absent, he would know I vowed him duty,
Present, he would find me at his side.

Pleasant fancy! for I had but letters,
Only knew of actions by hearsay:
He himself was busied with my betters;
What of that? My turn must come some day.

'Some day' proving--no day! Here's the puzzle.
Passed and passed my turn is. Why complain?
He's so busied! If I could but muzzle
People's foolish mouths that give me pain!

'Letters?' (hear them!) 'You a judge of writing?
Ask the experts!--How they shake the head
O'er these characters, your friend's inditing--
Call them forgery from A to Z !

'Actions? Where's your certain proof' (they bother)
'He, of all you find so great and good,
He, he only, claims this, that, the other
Action--claimed by men, a multitude?'

I can simply wish I might refute you,
Wish my friend would,--by a word, a wink,--
Bid me stop that foolish mouth,--you brute you!
He keeps absent,--why, I cannot think.

Never mind! Tho' foolishness may flout me.
One thing's sure enough; 'tis neither frost,
No, nor fire, shall freeze or burn from out me
Thanks for truth--tho' falsehood, gained--tho' lost.

All my days, I'll go the softlier, sadlier,
For that dream's sake! How forget the thrill
Thro' and thro' me as I thought, 'The gladlier
Lives my friend because I love him still!'

Ah, but there's a menace some one utters!
'What and if your friend at home play tricks?
Peep at hide-and-seek behind the shutters?
Mean your eyes should pierce thro' solid bricks?

'What and if he, frowning, wake you, dreamy?
Lay on you the blame that bricks--conceal?

Say 'At least I saw who did not see me,
Does see now, and presently shall feel'?'

'Why, that makes your friend a monster!' say you;
'Had his house no window? At first nod,
Would you not have hailed him?' Hush, I pray you!
What if this friend happen to be--God?

There are two additional references in the marginal notes and in Borges, footnotes and asides should be taken seriously. The first reference is to Jung’s Psychology and Alchemy, which serves to remind us of two recurring themes in Borges: the unconscious and the meaning of scientific rationality.

The second note refers back to Borges the writer. The question of author/and the authority of the author that confronted us at the end of Borges and I returns in the form of a reference to T. S. Eliot’s “points of view.” Looking at this reference to Eliot tells us something about how Borges deals with the problem of the author. Eliot’s “points of view” is concerned with the question of whether authoritative knowledge of an author’s intention - or even of the meaning of a text - is possible.
His early poetry broaches the question of authority as a matter of conduct and value. How might we gain authority over ourselves? And how might we reach definitive judgments about life’s meaning?.... Eliot’s first response to this dilemma is what his philosophy calls the ‘theory of points of view,’ which held that we can construct reliable --- though never indubitable – judgments through the accumulations of many immediate perspectives. David Chinitz. Companion to T. S. Eliot. John Wiley and Sons, Jun 22, 2009, pgs. 376-377.

We find these “accumulations of many immediate perspectives” scattered throughout the pages of Borges. There is accumulation of events, but not any development of psyches or unfolding quests. Characters do not grow nor do they develop. (Think Seinfeld here, if you would like a more popular reference.) They might enjoy those sudden epiphanies you can find in James Joyce’s short stories, but as in Joyce the epiphanic experience in Borges is either forgotten or passes over into “language and tradition.” The absence of character development is one result springing from Borges’ rejection of the Novel as a means of expression. As the preferred form of Modernist writing, the novel was essentially dependent upon character development. The plot had to unfold, the nature underneath had to be gradually revealed, etc. Borges might also reject the recent explosion of memoirs as well, or take a stance of welcoming the display of repetition one finds across these supposedly unique re-tellings of memories, all of which add to the "accumulation of many immediate perspectives” without moving us anywhere.

This accumulation tells us that there is no unity to the past, but also that as we line in time and space, there is no unity to us, either. Each of the many Borges is the real one and simultaneously a “false” one who is, on his own terms, also real. This multiplicity of perspectives aligns with Eliot’s “attack” on “the metaphysical theory of the substantial unity of the soul” and his disparaging of any idea of the unity of a self and an author who expresses:
“the poet has, not a ‘personality’ to express, but a particular medium, which is only a medium and not a personality, in which impressions and experiences combine in peculiar and unexpected ways. Impressions and experiences which are important for the man may take no place in the poetry, and those which become important in the poetry may play quite a negligible part in the man, the personality. T. S. Eliot (1888–1965).“Tradition and the Individual Talent” from The Sacred Wood. 1921.

So, just as Borges finds Kafka in the pages of others, so too can we find Borges prefigured already in the texts of Eliot, Kafka, Poe, Conrad, etc. We are again presented with a fragmented “self,” a fragmented and infinite past, and texts which are altered by our very reading and commentary.

But do not let me give you the impression that Borges is doing nothing more than - as he himself modestly put it - playing games with language and time. There is always in Borges’ work a concern with ethics in an indeterminate world lacking the surety of Enlightenment categories and optimism. For Borges, time is both circular and a labyrinth, infinite and perhaps determined perhaps not, but the place where reality and dreamworlds are equally real:
That pure representation of homogeneous objects – the night in serenity, a limpid little wall, the provincial scent of the honeysuckle, the elemental earth – is not merely identical to the one present on that corner so many years ago; it is, without resemblances or repetitions, the very same. Time, if we can intuitively grasp such an identity, is a delusion: the difference and inseparability of one moment belonging to its apparent past from another belonging to its apparent present is sufficient to disintegrate..... Denying temporal succession, denying the self, denying the astronomical universe, are apparent desperations and secret consolations. Our destiny (as contrasted with the hell of Swedenborg and the hell of Tibetan mythology) is not frightful by being unreal, it is frightful because it is irreversible and iron-clad. This is the substance I am made of. Time is a river which sweeps me along, but I am the river; it is a tiger which destroys me, but I am the tiger; it is a fire which consumes me, but I am the fire. The world, unfortunately, is real; I, unfortunately, am Borges (Borges, A New Refutation of Time).

All of this seems at odds with Modernism understood as the last avant garde of the Bourgeois era with its emphasis on individual artistic expression, exploration of the self through narrative, grand narratives of history, the Novel, the text as a singular and relatively autonomous object of criticism and work of individual creation. It appears so because Borges as well as a precursor such as Eliot took themselves to be modernists, or at least Borges once remarked that “say what you will of me, but at least you can not deny that I was a contemporary” (quoting Goethe, he said).

And let’s not forget that he and his contemporaries experienced the very social dislocations that we mentioned last week as the social context of the origins of Cultural Studies.

With WWI, we get the a seeming wholesale rejection of Enlightenment by both expressionism as well as the rising Fascism. We also have the supposed apex and demise of a Modernism defined by enlightenment, the individual artist/author/scholar, the novel, the work, the text a singular work of individual creation.

With World War II we find the rise of globalism, the Cold War and technological innovation, social movements centered on styles of life, to name a few. Many observers note a profound shift in the order of the world marked by:
1] the end of colonialism
2] the de-centering of Europe (and the “European”) as the key referent or norm against which all else is measured
3] the rise of the United States and the globalization of American culture

To which I would add a fourth, the Rise of Fascism and Authoritarianism, and societies of terror [i. e., control of everyday life and acceptance of authority]

Keeping these social and epistemological dislocations in mind, let’s turn to Borges’ insights into texts, authors, and the authority of knowledge through what we now refer to as intertextuality.

In Borges’ work, the individual text is deconstructed into its referential texts, the identity of the author becomes less and less important. The personality of the author is almost ignored, with the exception of their immediate experience.

Borges had been taken by the critics as the writer who discovered intertextuality, albeit via a different route, as had also a number of other writers, including Foucault, certain geographers, novelists such as Hesse in The Glass Bead Game, Flaubert in Sentimental Education, in the marginal notes of the Medieval scribes, Freud in his theory of the structure of the psyche.

The idea of intertextuality: the text is never close, it never refers only to itself, the author of the text is relatively unimportant, etc. The connections are to be found in and between the texts. More than that, each time we read a text we alter it, we rewrite it, and so produce another version of that text. Quite quickly one arrives at the Library of Babel:
In “The Library of Babel,” everything that can possibly be said has already been said: it contains all conceived and imagined languages, and even those which might be conceived or imagined; everything has been pronounced, even those things without meaning, so that the odds of discovering even the smallest formal coherence are extremely slight, as witnessed by the persevering search of those who have never been granted this dispensation. And yet standing above all these words is the rigorous and sovereign language that recovers them, tells their story, and is actually responsible for their birth: a language that is itself poised against death, because it is at the moment of falling into the shaft of an infinite Hexagon that the most lucid (and consequently the last) of the librarians reveals that even the infinity of language multiplies itself to infinity, repeating itself without end in the divided figures of the Same. -- Michel Foucault.  Language to Infinity.

And certainly we are close to the labyrinth of “Pierre Menard”

It is a revelation to compare Menard’s Don Quixote with Cervantes’. The latter, for example, wrote (part one, chapter nine):
. . . truth, whose mother is history, rival of time, depository of deeds, witness of the past, exemplar and adviser to the present, and the future’s counselor.
Written in the seventeenth century, written by the “lay genius” Cervantes, this enumeration is a mere rhetorical praise of history. Menard, on the other hand, writes:
. . . truth, whose mother is history, rival of time, depository of deeds, witness of the past, exemplar and adviser to the present, and the future’s counselor.
History, the mother of truth: the idea is astounding. Menard, a contemporary of William James, does not define history as an inquiry into reality but as its origin. Historical truth, for him, is not what has happened; it is what we judge to have happened. The final phrases—exemplar and adviser to the present, and the future’s counselor —are brazenly pragmatic.

The contrast in style is also vivid. The archaic style of Menard—quite foreign, after all—suffers from a certain affectation. Not so that of his forerunner, who handles with ease the current Spanish of his time.

There is no exercise of the intellect which is not, in the final analysis, useless. A philosophical doctrine begins as a plausible description of the universe; with the passage of the years it becomes a mere chapter—if not a paragraph or a name—in the history of philosophy. In literature, this eventual audacity is even more notorious. The Quixote —Menard told me—was, above all, an entertaining book; now it is the occasion for patriotic toasts, grammatical insolence and obscene de luxe editions. Fame is a form of incomprehension, perhaps the worst.

Lucretius is mentioned by Borges in his stories and essays; for example see page 224 where he gives the thesis of the article. It is fitting on many levels that Borges and Foucault often refer to Lucretius, because besides his name, we know almost nothing about him, other than that he lived between 95 and 55 B.C.E. He really is an author who is just a name and a poem. Lucretius is also fitting because he advocated a philosophy that lays, quite literally, in ruins such as Oinoanda and Herculaneum and yet still persists).

Foucault tells us that his The Order of Things was prompted in part by a reading of Borges that made him start to consider our modes of classifying the world. (This is the point where words and things can not be separated, where they become our way of classifying and giving meaning to the world.
This book first arose out of a passage in Borges, out of the laughter that shattered, as I read the passage, all familiar landmarks of my thought ---our thought, the thought that bears the stamp of our age and our geography --- breaking up all the ordered surfaces and all the planes with which we are accustomed to tame the wild profusion of existing things, and continuing long afterwards to disturb and threaten with collapse our age-old distinction between the Same and the Other. This passage quotes a 'certain Chinese encyclopedia' in which it is written that 'animals are divided into (a) belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) suckling pigs, (e) sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs,) (h) included in the present classification, (i) frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a fine camelhair brush, (l) et cetera, (m) having just broken the water pitcher, (n) that from a long way off look like flies.” In the wonderment of this taxonomy, the thing we apprehend in one great leap, the thing that, by means of the fable, is demonstrated as the exotic charm of another system of thought, is the limitation of our own, the stark impossibility of thinking that....

That passage from Borges kept me laughing a long time, though not without a certain uneasiness that I found hard to shake off. Perhaps because there arose in its wake the suspicion that there is a worse kind of disorder that that of the incongruous, the linking together of things that are inappropriate; I mean the disorder in which fragments of a large number of possible orders glitter separately in the dimension, without law or geometry.... -- Michel Foucault, preface to The Order ofThings: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences, xv.

Foucault’s book is about how particular discourses classify the world and how these classifications relate to one another as discourses comprising what he refers to as a “Regime of Truth” (the political overtones are important, because establishing the regime of truth is part of the analysis of the relations of power, which is Foucault’s larger project). He takes a number of discourses: natural history (often mentioned by Borges), political economy, linguistics, anthropology, wealth, etc. and try to understand what the calls the “functional conditions of specific discursive practices”(114), one of these specific discursive practices is the author function. By this, we along with Foucault mean that:
...an author’s name is not simply an element of speech. It’s presence is functional in that it serves as a means of classification. A name can group together a number of texts and thus differentiate them from others. A name also establishes different forms of relationships among texts. Neither Hermes nor Hippocrates existed in the same sense that we can say Balzac existed, but the fact that a number of texts were attached to a single name implies that relationships of homogeneity, filiation, reciprocal explanation, authentication, or common utilization were established among them. Finally, the author’s name characterizes a particular manner of existence of discourse. Discourse that possesses an author’s name is not to be immediately consumed and forgotten; neither is it accorded the momentary attention given to ordinary, fleeting words. Rather, its status and its manner of reception are regulated by the culture in which it circulates.
The author's name is not simply an element in a discourse... it performs a certain role in regard to narrative discourse, assuring a classificatory function. Such a name permits one to group together a certain number of texts, define them, differentiate them from and contrast them to others. In addition, it establishes a relationship among the texts.
It is... the result of a complex operation that constructs a certain being of reason that we call 'author.' Critics doubtless try to give this being of reason a realistic status, by discerning, in the individual, a 'deep' motive, a 'creative' power, or a 'design,' the milieu in which writing originates. Nevertheless, these aspects of an individual which we designate as making him an author are only a projection, in more or less psychologizing terms, of the operations we force texts to undergo, the connections we make, the traits we establish as pertinent, the communities we recognize, or the exclusions we practice.

At the end, Foucault announces that new questions must be asked and these questions no long focus on the single text and the intention of the author.

No longer the tiresome repetitions:
‘Who is the real author?’
‘Have we proof of his authenticity and originality?’
‘What has he revealed of his most profound self in his language?’
 New Questions will be heard:
‘What are the modes of existence on this discourse?’
‘Where does it come from; how is it circulated; who controls it?’
‘What placements are determined for possible subjects?’
‘Who can fulfill these diverse functions of the subject?’
Jorges Luis Borges remarked that “I do not write for a select minority, which means nothing to me, nor for that adulated platonic entity known as ‘The Masses.’ Both abstractions, so dear to the demagogue, I disbelieve in. I write for myself and for my friends, and I write to ease the passing of time.” (Preface to The Book of Sand, 1977). “What matter who’s speaking...?” as Foucault quoted Beckett.



Next:
Lecture Two - Borges: Fragments, Dreams, and the Meaning of Tradition, part II.



Thursday, February 2, 2012

Lecture Four: Kafka and the Crisis of the Society of Discipline


 
Lecture Four: Kafka and the Crisis of the Society of Discipline






_____________________

Reading: Franz Kafka,  In The Penal Colony.
[Updated January 22, 2020] 

So far in our attempts to explain the origins of Cultural Studies we have noted many instances of breaks or discontinuities in its history and geography.  I know that thus far the sheer variety of subjects touched on and the range of references might give the appearance of an unstructured curio cabinet.  There are two reasons for this misleading, though understandable,  appearance.

First, the work of Cultural Studies was very much marginal and always critical, even when its was committed to a particular cause.  This distance from the nodal points of authority is one of the treads of continuity that unites these works, even when direct communication was limited.  Though marginal,  disconnected and often exiled, like “tunnelers through a mountain working at opposite sides of the same mountain with different tools, without even knowing if they are working in each other’s direction” the work of Cultural Studies focused on the same objects of study: authority, everyday life, and the social relations of capital.  These critiques converge because of their attention to these objects.  It should not be surprising that in the middle of the 20th century, many were interested in questions of authority and domination, just as it is not surprising that today, these same issues continue to confront us as terror and the domination of nature.

Second, in terms of this critique of authority in these lectures, we are following a line of critique – and hopefully you have noticed this – a line of critique that is itself a critique of the very ideas of Culture and of history/identity.  We have moved from the critique of Enlightenment and the notions of rational authoritarianism, to Borges and the critique of notions such as the author and the authority of the author, the text, tradition, narrative, and the self.  We find this same critique, as did Borges and Adorno, in the works of Kafka.  We even find writing itself brought into view as an instrument of political violence and terror.   A defining characteristic of the State, as Max Weber pointed out, is that it has a monopoly on the means of violence.

As instruments, authority and terror are also artifacts of a society of discipline from its beginnings to its collapse:  the apparatus of the penal colony and the rambling law courts of Orson Wells and Kafka’s The Trial are both jury rigged and on the verge of a collapse that we, like K., know already happened.

Let’s step back to the moment when the disciplinary society became threatened by its own subjects and successful expansion of the Bourgeoisie.  Recall that famous assertion from the Communist Manifesto that “the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles.”  Straightforward as this might sound, it is actually rather nuanced: we are speaking of society and society is the history of multiple class struggles, but as to what a class is, that will always remain ambiguous in Marx’s writings and amorphous in reality.  We do know  that Engels amended this statement with a clarifying note to the 1888 English edition of the Communist Manifesto:
“That is, all written history.  In 1847, the prehistory of the social organization existing previous to recorded history, was all but unknown.”
Since the writing of the Manifesto 40 years earlier, the field of Anthropology had become increasingly professionalized and interpreters of Darwin were everywhere.  The work of the anthropologists Hasthausen and Morgan had established a past filed not with savages locked in a struggle of all against all, but a mosaic of primitive communistic societies “everywhere from India to Ireland” and yet they were not societies that used the written word.  To Engels the decisive turn towards civilization was the general use and knowledge of written language. 

So when Marx and Engels wrote that all of the history of society is the written history, they were in fact bringing together society, social conflict, and writing/civilization with the latter playing a central role in both social domination and in the domination of nature.  Indeed in the note Engels refers the reader to his own work The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State where he follows Morgan in finding that the “upper stage [of Barbarism] begins with the smelting of iron and passes into civilization with the invention of Alphabetic writing and its use for literary records.  Writing had to become public, rather than a special skill of the aristocracy and priesthoods.  In fact, what separates the writing of civilization from the writing of Barbarism (e.g., runes) is the public consumption of writing and the expansion of readers as well.”

Marx, too, makes the connection between writing and history in The German Ideology, which you will remember from the fragment I already showed you.  Marx observes that the writing of history and the modification of the earth and humans are all closely joined.  So again, we have writing, history, the domination of nature, and the domination of social relations --- which together are themselves a social formation which is never without domination and repression as Freud reminds us in The Future of an Illusion.

In Capital, Marx argues that the history of the transformation from feudalism to Bourgeois society, with its creation of the “free labourer” is “written in the annals of mankind in letters of blood and fire (Capital, vol. I, p.143).  We have heard this before, you might recall, from Sade’s Julliette:

“Into hands stained by the murder of spouses and children, sodomy, killing, prostitution, and infamy, heaven has placed these riches to reward me for such abominations.”

When Benjamin wrote of the horrific beauty of Klee’s Nova Angeles, he was within an already long tradition of critique.  We will hear this echoed in Nietzsche, Freud, and the darker writings of the Frankfurt School.

As the commodity is the crystallization of the accumulated labor time, so too is written history the crystallization of a real human struggle for life.  The past is the accumulation of these struggles or what we can piece together from the accumulated remains, but the writing of the past is the interpretation of the past, and that means that the history of the past is always bound up with the systems of power in the present.

To understand this idea of writing and power, let’s look at this excerpt from Levi-Strauss:
“Writing is a strange thing.  It would seem as if it appearance could not have failed to wreak profound changes in the living conditions of our race, and that these transformations must have been above all intellectual in character.  Once men know how to write, they are enormously more able to keep in being a large body of knowledge.  Writing might, that is to say, be regarded as a form of artificial memory, whose development should be accompanied by a deeper knowledge of the past and, therefore, by a greater ability to organize the present and the future.  Of all the criteria by which people habitually distinguish civilization from barbarism, this should be the one most worth retaining: that certain peoples write and others do not.  The first group can accumulate a body of knowledge that helps it to move ever faster toward the goal that it has assigned to itself; the second is confined within limits hat the memory of individuals can never hope to extend, and it must remain the prisoner of a history worked out from day to day, with neither a clear knowledge of its own origins nor a consecutive idea of what its future should be.

Yet nothing of what we know of writing, or of its role in evolution, can be said to justify this conception.  One of the most creative phases in human history took place with the onset of the neolithic era: agriculture and the domestication of animals are only two of the developments which may be traced to this period.  It must have had behind it thousands of years during which small societies of human beings were noting, experimenting, and passing on to one another the fruits of their knowledge.  The very success of this immense enterprise bears witness to the rigour and the continuity of its preparation, at a time when writing was quite unknown.  If writing first made its appearance between the fourth and third millennium before our era, we must see it not, in any degree, as a conditioning factor in the neolothic revolution, but rather as an already-distant and doubtless indirect result of that revolution.  With what great innovation can it be linked?  Where technique is concerned, architecture alone can be called into question.  Yet the architecture of the Egyptians or the Sumerians was no better than the work of certain American Indians who, at the time America was discovered, were ignorant of writing.  Conversely, between the invention of writing and the birth of modern science, the western world has lived through some five thousand years, during which time the sum of its knowledge has rather gone up and down than known a steady increase.  It has often been remarked that there was no great difference between the life of a Greek or Roman citizen and that of a member of the well-to-do European classes in the Eighteenth century.  In the neolothic age, humanity made immense strides forward without any help from writing; and writing did not save the civilizations of the western world from long periods of stagnation.  Doubtless the scientific expansion of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries could hardly have occurred, had writing not existed.  But this condition, however, necessary, cannot in itself explain that expansion.

If we want to correlate the appearance of writing with certain other characteristics of civilization, we must look elsewhere.  The one phenomenon which has invariably accompanied it is the formation of cities and empires: the integration into a political system, that is to say, of a considerable number of individuals, and the distribution of those individuals into a hierarchy of castes and classes.  Such is, at any rate, the type of development which we find, from Egypt right across to China, at the moment when writing makes its debuts; it seems to favor rather the exploitation than the enlightenment of mankind.  This exploitation made it possible to assemble workpeople by the thousand and set them tasks that taxed them to the limits of their strength: to this, surely, we must attribute the beginnings of architecture as we know it.  If my hypothesis is correct, the primary function of writing, as a means of communication, is to facilitate the enslavement of other human beings.  The use of writing for disinterested ends, and with a view to satisfactions of the mind in the fields either of science or the arts, as a secondary result of its invention – and may even be no more than a way of reinforcing, justifying, or dissimulating its primary function.

There are, however, exceptions to this rule.  Ancient Africa included empires in which several hundred thousand subjects acknowledge a singe rule; in pre-Columbian America, the Inca empire numbered several million subjects.  But, alike in  Africa and in America, these ventures were notable unstable: we know, for instance, that the Inca empire was established in the twelfth century or thereabouts.  Pizarro’s soldiers would never have conquered it so easily if it had not already, three centuries later, been largely decomposed.  And, from the little we know of the ancient history of Africa, we can divine an analogous situation: massive political groups seem to have appeared and disappeared within the space of not many decades.  It may be, therefore, that these instances confirm, instead of refuting, our hypothesis.  Writing may not have sufficed to consolidate human knowledge, but it may well have been indispensable to the establishment of an enduring domination.  To bring the matter nearer to our own time: the European-wide movement towards compulsory education in the nineteenth century went hand in hand with the extension of military service and the systematization of the proletariat.  The struggle against illiteracy is indistinguishable, at times, from the increased powers exerted over the individual citizen by the central authority.  For it is only when everyone can read that Authority can decree that ‘ignorance of the law is no defense’. [Emphasis added.] – Claude Levi-Strauss, Triste Tropiques, pp.291-293.
[Mull that over for a side discussion, but frame those discussions in terms of this dialectical aspect of writing, that it is at once emancipatory and simultaneously an instrument of power.  It would be intellectually dishonest to privilege the one aspect over the other simply because one appeals to our prejudices as academics.]

Levi-Strauss gets at the core of the dialectic in which I am trying to situate Kafka’s writings – and their importance for Cultural Studies: writing as a technique of Enlightenment and terror.

I should remind you again that culture in Cultural Studies consists of the artifacts and techniques of social relations.  It is not about an identification with us by a veneration or valuation one’s elective affinities, nor of promoting either high or popular culture.  Indeed, it is through the analysis and critique of artifacts (commodities and techniques (regulations, laws, social policy, the organization of knowledge, police powers, the State monopoly on violence, etc.) that we can begin to better understand the past and present structure of social relations.

From Sade to Conrad, Frank Norris, and Kafka, the imaginations of some writers of the bourgeois era captured glimpses of the apparatus of power, glimpses that can be directly derived from a critical inquiry into the accumulations of social life.  We will see in Terry Gilliam’s film Brazil that Sam Lowery’s dreams are filled with such glimpses into the real apparatus that he sees --but does not recognize – in everyday life ...... until it is too late.  But then, how could any of these works avoid providing us with these glimpses of what was for them “just the way the world is” and can we come to see our own relations of authority when we are immersed in them?  It is the essence of everyday life that it appears natural, and it is the work of Cultural Studies to de-naturalize the world in order to oppose the domination of nature and humans.  For the choice of the generations your own were as stark as “Socialism or Barbarism”  Let’s hope that yours makes a better choice than mine, if indeed either had or has a choice.

In any event, our recent generations share the experience of terror and the internalization of terror, the naturalizing of it as “just the way the world is” is something that is shared by all in the societies of control.   The difference is that at present the generalized terror has specific local effects, while the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction (M.A.D.) was also generalized in its effects.  Under the doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction one was always terrorized and one still is, except that now the threat we are always being reminded of is the stray bag on the subway, and not global annihilation.  Not that that minor threat has gone away, it is still just present and if anything the threat is greater now than in 1960.  In a sense it has become an adjunct to the global environmental crisis.

During the Cold War, we lived in a state of terror, and the State is a fundamental source of terror.  After all, only States had nuclear weapons and States monopolized the scientific knowledge of modern weaponry.  The State was constantly reminding us to be terrified and of the sensation of terror.  We internalized that terror as M.A.D and now we do the same using WMDs.

When Henri Lefebvre wrote of our “terrorist society’ – as oppose to a merely terrorized society – he argued that this social formation “was first perceived by writers and critics” of the bourgeois era (Lefebvre, Everyday Life in the Modern World, p.143).  Their writings mark the transformation from a society of discipline to a society of control and Kafka’s writings in particular are a mark of this transformation.  If the writers of the bourgeois era had already grasped the extent of the repressive apparatus of Enlightenment Reason (Horkheimer), then we have ample reason to examine their works along side the other ruins.  This is the reason why we turn to Sade, Conrad, Poe, Raymond Chandler, Chester Himes, etc., as well as Kafka and Borges.  The connection between civilization and writing as both recording of history and as a mark of violence is why we must read Kafka’s The Trial and In the Penal Colony into the genealogy of Cultural Studies.

Kafka's Drawings for The Trial
Kafka’s works abound with parables that can stand alone, such as “Before the Law” and stories within stories where we can find the repetition of everyday life – a sense of deja vu or a continual starting over/return to what is already present.  But there are also the repetitions of dreams, fantasies and desires which we find intruding into and breaking off narratives.  In Orson Well’s adaptation of The Trial, this is brought to the fore as K. is constantly distracted by his sexual desires from attending to “his case.”  We will also see this in Gilliam’s Brazil in coming weeks. 

For Adorno, Kafka’s use of deja vu is permanent: 
“...each sentence says ‘interpret me’, and with it the question ‘where have I seen that before?’; the deja vu is declared permanent.  Through the power with which Kafka commands interpretation, he collapses aesthetic distance.  He demands a desperate effort of the allegedly ‘disinterested’ observer of an earlier time, overwhelms him, suggesting that far more than his intellectual equilibrium depends on whether he truly understands; life and death are at stake.” (Adorno, “Kafka” from Prisms, p.246).
As with Borges, the reader becomes actively engaged in the writing of the text; it is the reader who “completes the text.”  Adorno sees that reading Kafka engages the reader into becoming an author.  This active reader has very much like the same importance as the active listener to the New Music from Schoenberg and Webern to Henry Cow and Robert Fripp.  And just as in the New Musics, we find that this active engagement with the text provides the reader with the element of shock that interrupts the routine and the everyday: 
“Among Kafka’s presuppositions, not the least is that the contemplative relation between text and reader is shaken to its very roots.  His texts are designed not to sustain a constant distance between themselves and their victim but rather to agitate his feelings to a point where he fears that the narrative will shoot towards him like a locomotive in a three-dimensional film.” (Adorno, “Kafka” from Prisms, p.246)
Let’s not forget the centrality of dreams in Borges and Kafka. 
Orson Wells characterizes The Trial as “a dream or a nightmare” and opens his film The Trial with K. awakening as though from a dream, or perhaps even drifting off into a dream.  It is the most dangerous time of the day, Kafka wrote in a deleted passage from The Trial.
As someone said to me – I can’t remember now who it was – it is really remarkable that when you wake up in the morning you nearly always find everything in exactly the same place as the evening before.  For when asleep and dreaming you are, apparently as least, in an essentially different state from that of wakefulness; and therefore, as that man truly said, it requires enormous presence of mind or rather quickness of wit, when opening your eyes to seize hold as it were of everything in the room as exactly the same place where you had let it go on the previous evening.  That is why, he said, the moment of waking up was the riskiest moment of the day.  Once that was well over without deflecting you from your orbit, you could take heart of grace for the rest of the day. (Adorno, “Kafka” from Prisms, p.258)
In the film, K. is awakening and bringing the world into focus just as the Officer comes through the door.  In the book, however, K. is already awake and wondering why Mrs. Grubach does not have breakfast ready yet when the routine of everyday life is interrupted and through the interruption the everyday becomes de-naturalized and even takes on a sinister hue.  From then on, every action, even the ringing of the bell for Mrs. Grubach, becomes double sided and confirms his guilt.  It reminds one of the opening to Proust’s Remembrance of Things Past, except that the bourgeois contemplative reveling in his recollections is not a part of The Trial. No, rather it seems to be implied that until his arrest K.’s mornings may have been the mornings typical of a young banker.   K.’s revels are interrupted first by the absence of Mrs. Grubach, then by the surveillance of “the old lady” across the way, by his own ringing of the bell, and finally by the appearance of the Official coming through K.’s door.  He is, after all, hungry, i. e., K. remains a physical being and that is an inescapable reality no matter what the content of our dreams and fantasies.

And as with Borges, dreams become a way to begin understanding Kafka’s writings:
“Cocteau rightly pointed out that the introduction of anything startling in the form of a dream invariably removes its sting.  It was to prevent such misuse that Kafka himself interrupted The Trial at a decisive point with a dream – he published the truly horrifying piece in A Country Doctor – and by contrast confirmed the reality of everything else, even if it should be that dream-reality suggested periodically in The Castle and America by passages so agonizingly drawn out that they leave the reader gasping for air.  Among the moments of shock, not the least results from the fact that Kafka takes dreams a la lettre.  Because everything that does not resemble the dream and its pre-logical logic is excluded, the dream itself is excluded.  It is not the horrible which shocks, but its self-evidence.... The attitude that Kafka assumes towards dreams should be the reader’s towards Kafka.  He should dwell on the incommensurable, opaque details, the blind spots. (Adorno, “Kafka” from Prisms, p.248).
When Josef K. encounters the everyday routines of the Law Offices, he becomes dizzy. The offices are not only dreamlike, but a suffocating interior world – in which his own psyche is made to appear before him alienated and oppressing him.  The distance between his interior and exterior, between his work, the law courts, his office, the artists studio become steadily reduced until they are all just rooms in an immense bureaucratic office.


This collision between the fantasy and the reality of social relations is something that we will see again in Brazil.
In the Penal Colony is a much more concentrated work than The Trial, and better displays the sense of the transition or transformation.  In The Trial, K. has been arrested and his exploration of the apparatus of the Law are from the vantage point of the accused who is already-guilty.  In the Penal Colony, the apparatus is the center of attention, not the accused/convicted, and the Explorer is more the observer from that part of the world which is progressing beyond the disciplinary brutalities of the Apparatus.

The Officer already knows what recommendation the Explorer will write in his letter to the new Commandant.  The Explorer's task is not so much to evaluate the Apparatus, but to witness its demise: 
“I can hear his voice – the ladies call it a voice of thunder – well, and this is what he says:  ‘A famous Western investigator, sent out to study criminal procedure in all the countries of he world, has just said that our old tradition of administering justice is inhumane.  Such a verdict from such a personality makes it impossible for me to countenance these methods any longer.  Therefore from this very day I ordain...’ and so on... and I and the work of the old Commandant will be done for” (p.212).
We have seen this Apparatus at the moment of its very inception in Sade’s apparatuses and machines of pleasure/pain.  We see it again in Wells’ portrayal of the law offices in The Trial and In the Penal Colony, but in both these two instances from Kafka, the Apparatus is crumbling materially and ideologically. 

We could trace out this transformation with this scheme, with the proviso that like all schemes it is by definition simplistic:


Societies of Discipline                Societies of Control
(Terrorized Societies)                (Surveillance and Terror)
-----
The Apparatus                             Power/Knowledge
of violence/pleasure (Sade)        Terror, Desire, Authority

Direct Discipline                     Institutionalized/Internalized Terror
Guilt is assumed                     Guilt must be constantly experienced

Natural Power                          Naturalized state power
of Ruler/Tyrant

Under the disciplinary regimes, punishment was direct.  It was conducted in public and punishment was was a spectacle carried out on the body of the condemned in keeping with the dictates of Reason.  This we certainly touched on in our perusal of Constitutio Criminalis Theresiana .  Relations of power were the result of the naturalized power of the Ruler/Tyrant to judge.

The society of Enlightenment was a disciplinary society, but so too are control societies premised on the same reason and rationality.  They are continuous in their institutions: bureaucracy, the machine, the factory, prison, hospital, school/university, etc.

Under regimes of Control however, discipline is internalized.  One does not need the hand of the police if one simply learns to obey the rules.  And all the better that one willingly accepts a regime than be force to comply with its laws.  The powers that were once represented by the body of the Sovereign were now naturalized as powers of the State and everyday life reproduces those relations.  Josef K. stands between all of these.  His is marginalized.  In terms of a disciplinary regime, his guilt is assumed, but unlike a disciplinary regime, his punishment is postponed.  His guilt must be constantly experienced and yet he demands to be found innocent.  Even as he comes to realize the absurdity of the Law, the same Reason that brought him to that emancipatory moment is also the means by which he internalizes its operations.  In his speech at his first interrogation K. lays out the entire apparatus of power whose existence had, until the moment of his arrest, apparently never bothered him in the least.

“‘What has happened to me,’ K. went on, rather more quietly than before, trying at the same time to read the faces in the first row, which gave his speech a somewhat disconnected effect, ‘what has happened to me is only a single instance and as such of no great importance, especially as I do not take it very seriously, but it is representative of a misguided policy which is being directed against many other people as well.  It is for these that I take up my stand here, not for myself.... ‘There can be no doubt....  – there  can be no doubt that behind all the actions of this court of justice, that is to say in my case, behind my arrest and today’s interrogation, there is a great organization at work.  An organization which not only employs corrupt warders, oafish Inspectors, and Examining Magistrates of whom the best that can be said is that they recognize their own limitations, but also has at its disposal a judicial hierarchy of high, indeed of the highest rank, with an indispensable and numerous retinue of sevants, clerks, police, and other assistants, perhaps even hangmen.  I do not shrink from that word.  And the significance of this great organization, gentlemen?  It consists in this, that innocent persons are accused of guilt, and senseless proceedings are put in motion against them, mostly without effect, it is true, as in my own case.  But considering the senselessness of the whole, how is it possible for the higher ranks to prevent gross corruption in their agents?  It is impossible.  Even the highest Judge in this organization can not resist it.  So the warders try to steal the clothes off the bodies of the people they arrest, the Inspectors break into strange houses, and innocent men, instead of being fairly examined, are humiliated in the presence of public assemblies.  The warders mentioned certain depots where the property of prisoners is kept;  I should like to see these depots where the hard-earned property of arrested men is left to rot, or at least what remains of it after thieving officials have helped themselves” (pp.45-46).
Even at the beginning of his deferred case, the absurdity of it all makes sense to him.  And with his speech, which the Usher’s wife assures him cause quite a stir and set the Examining Magistrate to writing page after page to document his interrogation. 

There is another precursor to Kafka that you may want to consider, for perhaps it is an artifact of the early disciplinary society, just as the In The Penal Colony is of the end of that society.  Compare Kafka’s parable Before the Law, which Wells places as a prologue but which actually occurs during Josef. K.’s encounter with the Priest (the “prison chaplain”), with the brief chapter “The Prison Door” from Nathaniel Hawthorne’s Scarlet Letter:
The Prison Door

A THRONG of bearded men, in sad-colored garments, and gray, steeple-crowned hats, intermixed with women, some wearing hoods and others bareheaded, was assembled in front of a wooden edifice, the door of which was heavily timbered with oak, and studded with iron spikes. The founders of a new colony, whatever Utopia of human virtue and happiness they might originally project, have invariably recognized it among their earliest practical necessities to allot a portion of the virgin soil as a cemetery, and another portion as the site of a prison. In accordance with this rule, it may safely be assumed that the forefathers of Boston had built the first prison-house somewhere in the vicinity of Cornhill, almost as seasonably as they marked out the first burial-ground, on Isaac Johnson's lot, and round about his grave, which subsequently became the nucleus of all the congregated sepulchers in the old churchyard of King's Chapel. Certain it is, that, some fifteen or twenty years after the settlement of the town, the wooden jail was already marked with weather - stains and other indications of age, which gave a yet darker aspect to its beetle-browed and gloomy front. The rust on the ponderous iron-work of its oaken door looked more antique than anything else in the New World. Like all that pertains to crime, it seemed never to have known a youthful era. Before this ugly edifice, and between it and the wheel track of the street, was a grass-plot, much overgrown with burdock, pigweed, apple-peru, and such unsightly vegetation, which evidently found something congenial in the soil that had so early borne the black flower of civilized society, a prison. But, on one side of the portal, and rooted almost at the threshold, was a wild rosebush, covered, in this month of June, with its delicate gems, which might be imagined to offer their fragrance and fragile beauty to the prisoner as he went in, and to the condemned criminal as he came forth to his doom, in token that the deep heart of Nature could pity and be kind to him.

 *****
The Apparatus

http://grupthink.com/answer/109529/In_the_Penal_Colony_-_Franz_Kafka


“‘It’s a remarkable piece of apparatus’ said the Officer to the Explorer.... The machinery should go on working continuously for twelve hours’” (p.191).   A glimpse of the camps, perhaps, in that the machinery operated continuously, but the camps had not yet been constructed.  The Officer wants to explain the apparatus, but, Kafka tells us, “the Explorer did not much care about the apparatus” (p.191) and displayed a “visible indifference” to it, at least at first.   The Explorer is not alone in this indifference.  No one is interested in the execution of a soldier condemned for “disobedience and insulting behavior to a superior” -- which seems like a serious crime until Kafka reveals the absurdity of the orders the soldier had been given.  Where once the spectacle of the execution – you see it in Westerns, for example – was the demonstration of authority, now that authority permeated everyday life and so there was no longer the need for a special demonstration of violence.  The executions no longer drew the crowds.  Even the residents of the colony had grown indifferent to the continuous executions. 

There is a new Commandant who is not approving of the workings of the apparatus, but has not choice but to allow it to continue, at least for now.  The apparatus and the colony share their origin in the head of the dead Commandant:
“‘This apparatus,’ he said, taking hold of a crank handle and leaning against it, ‘it was invented by our former Commandant.  I assisted at the very earliest experiments and had a share in all the work until its completion.  But the credit of inventing it belongs to him alone... Well, it isn’t saying much if I tell you that the organization of the whole penal colony is his work.  We who were his friends knew even before  he died that the organization of the colony was so perfect that his successor, even with a thousand schemes in his head, would find it impossible to alter anything, at least for many years to come and our prophesy has come true’” (p.193).
The officer refers to it as a machine: “let’s have a look at this machine” (p.192)
We are not really given a description of the Penal Colony.  We learn something of its geography, but we learn much more about the Apparatus.  (Perhaps the Apparatus is the Penal Colony and vise versa) We learn that it is located in “a small valley, a deep hollow surrounded on all sides by naked crags” (p.191).   We also learn that the officer’s uniform was made for the cooler climate of the imperial center and so is “too heavy for the tropics” (p.192).  The Apparatus is outside and seemingly exposed to the elements, but its decline is not blamed on the weather.  In fact, the Explorer twice has to shade his eyes from the bright sunlight.  Kafka writes that the Apparatus is “a huge affair” and yet the Bed and the Designer are the same size, “like two dark wooden chests” with “the Designer hung about two meters over the Bed; each of them bound at the corners with four rods of brass that almost flashed out rays of sunlight.  Between the chests shuttled the Harrow on a ribbon of steel” (p.195). Though "a huge affair" it can accommodate only one prisoner at a time.

We’ve encounter an unstable space where the colony is both on the periphery and at the center, where the Apparatus is the size of one person and as infinite as the Penal Colony itself.  Not unlike the map described in Borges’ poem “On Scientific Rigor” that we perused last time.  The penal colony is literally an enclosure/prison island for those cast off from the community (Nietzsche, Genealogy of Morals).

Even as he extolls the timelessness of the Apparatus, the Officer is constantly adjusting it.  The cogwheel that is making too much noise particular irks him: “one of the cog wheels is the Designer is badly worn; it creaks a lot when it is working; you can hardly hear yourself speak; spare parts, unfortunately, are difficult to get here.”  It is greasy and oily, as evidenced by the Officer’s need to wash his hands.  Like the Law Courts, the Apparatus is obviously breaking down.

The Apparatus “consists... of three parts.  In the course of time each of these parts has acquired a kind of popular nickname.  The lower one is called the ‘Bed,’ the upper one the ‘Designer,’ and this one here in the middle that moves up and down is called the ‘Harrow’” (pg.193).  In the past “a few things still had to be set by hand, but from this moment it works by itself” (p.192)

The Bed is completely covered with a layer of cotton wool and has straps for the wrists, ankles, and neck of the condemned, who is forced to lay face-down.  There is a special gag of cotton wool “to prevent his screaming and biting his tongue” (p.195).  In a measure of mercy or to increase the torment, “an electrically heated basin” (p.202) of gruel is available to the condemned during "the execution of the sentence."

Cotton Wool or raw cotton.

Let’s turn to the text:
“Both the Bed and the Designer have an electric battery.  The Bed needs one for itself, the Designer for the Harrow.  As soon as the man is strapped down, the Bed is set in motion.  It quivers in minute very rapid vibrations, both from side to side and up and down.  You may have seen a similar apparatus in hospitals[*] but in our Bed the movements are all precisely calculated, you see, they have to correspond very exactly to the movement of the Harrow.  And the Harrow is the instrument for the actual execution of the sentence” (pp.195-1960).
(* This may be a reference to the contemporary “Induced Rhythmic Motion” therapy which used vibrating hospital beds.
They are now marketed as “Toning Beds.”  )

Running short of time – just as we are! – the Officer promises to fill in the details tomorrow, but for the moment, he gives only the essentials of the disciplinary technology of government.
“When the man lies down on the bed and it begins to vibrate, the Harrow is lowered onto his body.  It regulates itself automatically so that the needles barely touch his skin.  Once contact is made the steel ribbon stiffens immediately into a rigid band.  And then the performance begins.  An ignorant onlooker would see no difference between one punishment and another.  The Harrow appears to do its work with uniform regularity.  As it quivers, its points pierce the skin of the body whish is itself quivering from the vibration of the Bed.  So that the actual progress of the sentence can be watched, the Harrow is made of glass.  Getting the needles fixed in the glass was a technical problem, but after many experiments we overcame the difficulty.  No trouble was too great for us to take, you see.  And now anyone can look through the glass and watch the inscription taking form on the body.... there are two kinds of needles arranged in multiple patterns.  Each long needle has a short one beside it.  The long needle does the writing and the short needle sprays a jet of water to wash away the blood and keep the inscription clear” (p.200).
And the blood and water flow down open drains into the pit below the Apparatus.

But what is most important is not the machine, but the inscription – the Sentence – that it will be written on the body of the condemned.  “How does the sentence run?” asked the Explorer (p.196).  The Officer’s reply is instructive and leads us to consider not only the machinery of punishment, but also the machinery of the law:  “Our sentence does not sound so severe.  Whatever commandment the prisoner has disobeyed is written upon his body by the Harrow” (p.197).... the most important thing.... In the Designer are all the cogwheels that control the movements of the Harrow, and this machine is regulated according to the inscription demanded by the sentence” (p.202).

Here is an example of a harrow, in case you are not familiar with the device:

The Explorer is allowed to see the inscription – the document is too fragile for anyone other than the Officer to risk touching and he tells the Explorer that “the script itself runs round the body only in a narrow girdle; the rest of the body is reserved for the embellishments...” (pp.202-203). 

What the Explorer sees is “no calligraphy for school children....”  it is – and we can almost hear Borges’ laughter – “a labyrinth of lines crossing and recrossing each other which covered the paper so thickly that it was difficult to discern the blank spaces between them” (p.202).

The Apparatus is a writing machine, a guide, a bed, and a machine operating in accordance with and reproducing the rules/plan/design of the dead Commandant.

Government and writing, knowledge and power are inseparably intertwined with each other.  The violence of governing populations and territories is inseparable from writing (and statistics as well!).  What is it that bureaucracies do that is not connected with writing and calculation?

What makes Kafka's work so frightening is his critique of the everyday.  “It is not the horror that shocks, but its self-evidence” (Adorno, “Kafka” from Prisms, p.248).  The fact, one might say, that we knew all along and yet chose not to know.  Of course, the disciplinary societies were in crisis and collapsed along with the disappearance of their conditions for existence:  conditions such as imperialism, colonialism, urbanization and industrialization, Fordism, and the domination of Nature.  We can in hindsight say look back on the collapse of the disciplinary societies and say “Well, of course!  The impending collapse of such a brutal social system was obvious!”  One day the same will be said of our systems of social relations.  “Well, of course!”

Social systems are inherently unstable and finite in time.  To put that another way, to put it positively, is to acknowledge the concept of social change.  We can argue about the causes, mechanisms, and results of changes in human social relations.  But what we can’t do is deny that social change is a reality of human existence.  History is in fact the narrative we construct of these accumulated and sometimes violent social transformations.  It is not true, though it is about Truth, and it is limited, for if it contained the writing of all of the past, we would only find ourselves in amongst the stacks of Borges' Library of Babel.

So Kafka captures one of these moments: the transformation from a disciplinary society to a new society of control.  He does so through a ruthless undermining and de-naturalizing of the everyday.  He also does it with a wry humor and laughter at absurdity that is captured nicely by in Orson Wells’ retelling.    He is one of the writers of the bourgeois era that, from his rather marginal social position, illuminated the decline of  a social world and the social movement towards a different, though not necessarily better society.  Just because there is social change does not imply that this change is for the better.  One can quite easily have a notion of social change without having a notion of social progress, but one can not have an idea of progress without accepting social change.. 

If you want one final marker of the collapse of disciplinary societies and one that displays the indeterminacy of social change, have a look at Fritz Lang’s M.  which presents a disciplinary society at its end, and it is an end that leads to a choice between authoritarianisms.  This is further announced in Lang’s Metropolis with the handshake of reconciliation between labor and capital under the watching eye of the demigod.  Whose to say that the android wasn’t in the end an authentic replica? 

Let’s conclude on this note.  Marx demonstrated that increased cooperation brings with it material benefits, including increased skill, knowledge, and division of labor.  But that this greater cooperation also brings with it increased surveillance, control of social production, and affirmation of the technological domination of nature and humans.

The new society operates on the body in new ways.  It does not need to punish when the status quo becomes naturalized, where our dreams and fantasies are no less a part of the reproduction of everyday life than is our entertainment.... but the old technologies of discipline kept at the ready... just in case.  In the Penal Colony no one comes to witness the spectacle of execution anymore.  There were once large crowds and immense spectacles of discipline, but now come down to four mere lonely figures.  Compare these to the final scenes of Hawthorne’s Scarlet Letter.  The crowd that is so important to those scenes as the sentence is inscribed on the dying is absent from the Penal Colony.  No one cares anymore.  The Disciplinary Society is already receding into the past, leaving behind broken machines, derelicts towns, and abandoned guards with useless prisoners.  Once, the Officer laments,
“...the assembled company – no high official dared to absent himself – arranged itself around the machine; this pile of cane chairs is a miserable survival from that epoch.  The machine was freshly cleaned and glittering.  I got new spare parts for almost every execution.  Before hundreds of spectators – all of them standing tiptoe as far as the heights there – the condemned man was laid under the Harrow by the Commandant himself.  What is left today for a common soldier to do was then my task, the task of the presiding judge, and was an honor for me.  And then the execution began!  No discordant noise spoilt the working of the machine.  Many did not care to watch it but lay with closed eyes in the sand; they all knew:  Now Justice is being done.  In the silence once heard nothing but the condemned man’s sighs, half muffled by the felt gag.  Nowadays the machine can no longer wring from anyone a sign louder than the felt gag can stifle....” (p.209).
The Explorer and the New (and unseen) Commandant do not overtly destroy the Apparatus, they simply allow it to run its course and fall to pieces.  No doubt the tortures and  punishments remain useful to the new Commandant and many aspects of the previous apparatus, particularly the violence of writing, will be incorporated into the one that the Explorer flees towards.  While fleeing the punishments of the past Apparatus, he is in fact also fleeing towards a new Apparatus that we will call, for the sake of argument, the Society of Control.

As the Explorer says to the Officer:
“You overestimate my influence; the Commandant has read my letters of recommendation, he knows that I am no expert in criminal procedure.  If I were to give an opinion, it would be as a private individual, an opinion no more influential than that of the Commandant, who, I am given to understand, has very extensive powers in this penal colony.  If his attitude to your procedure is as definitely hostile as you believe, then I fear the end of your tradition is at hand, even without any humble assistance from me” (p.212).


 

Next Lecture: 
Degeneracy, Culture, and Critique